Research On Pricing And Coordination Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Government Premium And Penalty

With the development of our society, human beings face more and more environmental pollution and resource scarcity phenomenon. In order to improve resource utilization and achieve sustainable development, governments have taken measures to boost reverse logistics activities which promote the emergence and development of the theory of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), so that it’s widely concerned by all social sectors and the quantitative study on CLSC under government influence has become a research hotspot. However, the existing studies on the remanufacturing activities under government interference are chosen the manufacturer as research object, and the retailer is seldom considered. There are few studies about the coordination of CLSC under government interference, so that this paper conducted the following research:First of all, based on the theory of the CLSC management, the CLSC under government interference, this paper establishes MRCRM CLSC models under centralized and decentralized decision-making models, and then uses the K-T conditions and backward induction method to solve them. The results show that there is "double marginalization" problem in the decentralized decision-making CLSC and in combination with the theory of Pricing and Coordination of CLSC; a quantity discount contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized decision-making CLSC. Based on that, a numerical example analysis is made so as to verify the correctness of the conclusions.The second, based on the construction and solving method of CLSC without government interference, this paper establishes and solves a MRCRM CLSC models with government premium and penalty under centralized and decentralized decision-making models, then uses the improved quantity discount contract to coordination the model and make a numerical example analysis to verify the correctness of the conclusions.The last, through comparing and analyzing the results of the CLSC models with or without government premium and penalty, we know that the different ranges of government premium and penalty intensity or the different minimum recovery rate influence the trend of each decision variable and each member’s profit in the CLSC.The research shows that the improved quantity discount contract could coordinate the decentralized decision-making CLSC with or without government premium and penalty. In addition, when the government premium and penalty was imposed on the retailer, only by setting a reasonable minimum recovery and premium and penalty intensity and making each member’s profits in the CLCS with government interference is higher than that without government interference, each member in the CLCS could be motivated, which will encourage the activities of recycle and remanufacture old products in the reverse supply chain. This can improve the utilization rate of resources which help us to get a win-win goal of economic development and ecological benefits.