Agricultural Supply Chain Optimization And Analysis On Game Of Quality Supervision

With the development of economy, the traditional agricultural-products and selling patterns are facing changes in two aspects:on the one hand, with the rapid increase of people’s living standards, people have increasingly high demand for agricultural-products. In recent years, as the result of "agriculture-supermarket jointing" gradual development, the fierce momentum of agricultural-products directly entering to the retailer (in our country, mainly related to supermarket chains, convenience stores, etc.) is increasing. It’s not only a great convenience for people’s life, enhancement of the retailer’s popularity and sales, but also effectively increase the farmers’income. However, the attendant is also facing many problems, such as loss of agricultural-products, high inventory costs, fierce market competition and other issues. It has been a thorny problem faced by retailers. On the other hand, due to changes in modern population and family structure, consumer demands for agricultural-products and services continue to rise, agricultural consumption forms a new concept of consumption, consumers not only concerned about the basic utility, and more concerned about food safety. Therefore, how to control the loss of research to determine the optimal order of agricultural supply chain and food safety issues has importantly theoretical and practical significance.Firstly, this paper focused on a supply chain consisting of one retailer and one supplier, investigating its order decisions in the presence of the intractable problem of entities wastage of fresh agricultural-product. We constructed once delivering and twice delivering model respectively on the basis of the retailer’s once ordering in advance, and find out that the optimal ordering quantity is greater with twice delivering than that with once delivering. Moreover, compared with once delivering, maximum profits of both members are greater under twice delivering. Numerical analysis is applied to demonstrate that both the retailer and the supplier share the channel risk due to the wastage of fresh agricultural-product, and that setting appropriate wholesale price in the selling season proves to have a positive effect in enhancing the ability against loss risks. Our conclusions provide vital significance in depth practice of agriculture-supermarket jointing.Secondly, from the perspective of the quality and safety of agricultural-products, the paper builds a "government-enterprises" safety supervision game model. In view of the current situation in China and based on different regulation modes, the paper obtains evolutionary stable strategies under different circumstances by formulating replicated dynamics equations between enterprises and the government. The impacts of realistic parameters regarding regulatory success rate, third-party reports probability on ultimate strategy are analyzed. The results show that corporate violations are affected by non-compliance penalties, third-party regulations as well as the success rate of government regulations and these three factors are complementing each other. It is wise for the authority to size up the situation and undertake various initiatives under different contexts, curbing enterprise irregularities effectively. Through the above research, the paper provides constructive comments for the policy improvement of market regulation.