The Competition Game Research Of High Speed Railway And Civil Aviation

The rapid growth of Chinese socio-economic level has driven the rapid development of transportation industry. With passenger demand increasing, road network structure of high speed railway gets improved and transportation network of civil aviation gets expanded. High speed railway and civil aviation both take passenger transport in a short time, which makes the two replace each other and thus casus intense competition of the two in terms of passenger transport. Inappropriate competition between high speed railway and civil aviation not only decreases own revenue, but also causes a series of social problems. Therefore, this paper researches game competition between high speed railway and civil aviation and develops an appropriate competitive strategy, thus to improve the revenue of high speed railway and civil aviation, optimize the allocation of resources and promote orderly competition.On the basis of the research situation at home and abroad, this paper summarizes related theory of game competition and passenger flow forecast, analyzes the formation mechanism of high speed railway passenger flow and influence factors of passenger flow, and predicts generating passenger flow, induced passenger flow and transferring passenger flow through improved grey Gompertz model, the gravity model and Logit model based on generalized cost respectively. On the basis of passenger flow forecast, this paper establishes a game competition model of high speed railway and civil aviation according to different development stages of high speed railway. When high speed railway newly enter into the transportation corridor, high speed railway and civil aviation make free game competition to maximize own revenue. When high speed railway grow and mature, government regulate game competition between high speed railway and civil aviation to maximize the total social revenue. This paper applies the game competition model to empirical research about game competition between Beijing-Shenyang high speed railway and civil aviation, calculates the game equilibrium prices and corresponding passenger market shares of Beijing-Shenyang high speed railway and civil aviation in different development stages of the Beijing-Shenyang high speed railway, analyzes the impact of rapidity and comfort on own revenue and total social revenue with equilibrium prices, and verifies the validity of the game competition model.