Evolutionary Game Theory On Thermal Power Peaking Under Large Scale Of Wind Power Integration

With the proportion of wind power installed capacity increasing,the grid needs the demand for auxiliary services is increasing.In order to promote the scale of wind power in the grid,it is necessary to ensure that the fluctuation of the wind power to be meet after the integration.the peaking capacity of thermal plants play a key role in the actual acceptance of wind power by the grid.Therefore,it is very important to improve the peak-peaking auxiliary service compensation and trading mechanism,so as to promote the scale of wind power connected and ensure the safe and stable operation of the grid after the integration.The paper analyzes the problems existing in the development of the wind power industry,especially the wind power integration consumption.Through the analysis,it can be found that the peaking behavior of the thermal power plants is one of the main factors affecting the wind power consumption.Based on the capacity of thermal power plants and the highest peak-rate,the k-medoids clustering method was used to classify thermal power plants according to the characteristics of peak-rate.On the basis of the division of paid and unpaid peaking,the concept of peak-rate indicator is introduced,improved the existing peaking auxiliary service compensation mechanism.Based on the analysis of the improved compensation mechanism of peaking auxiliary service and the background of large-scale wind power integration,it can be deduced that the peaking evolutionary game of thermal power plants can be transformed into the electricity bidding and peaking auxiliary service revenue evolutionary game model.The thermal power plant is the main body of the electricity market,the thermal power plant have limited characteristics of rationality.The strategies adopted by each thermal power plant enterprises are drove by the profit and other competitor’s strategies during the management activities,Therefore,during the w hole bidding process,the thermal power plants make corresponding favorable evaluation according to the dynamic changes of the market and the expected decisions of other thermal power plants,this strategy can be regarded as a dynamic process until the equ ilibrium.Based on the analysis above,this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of the peaking behavior of thermal power plants on the background of large scale wind power integration,and discusses the bidding strategies and the payment under th e two kinds of scenarios of the auxiliary service compensation,this paper solve the stability strategy of two kinds of scenarios respectively.combing the phase trajectory diagram,the main factors influencing the stabilization strategy of the peaking beh avior evolutionary game model of thermal power plants are analyzed.According to the factors analysis above,the policy analysis and the suggestions for developing a healthy electricity market are put forward from the perspective of the electricity market supervisory department.The evolutionary game model considering peak-aiding compensation is similar to the stability strategy without consideration,which reflects that there is a problem in China’s electricity market-the amount of compensation for peak-shaving auxiliary service do not reflect the actual cost and the economic benefits under the peak-shaving situation,that is,the existing auxiliary service compensation pay more attention to mobilize the enthusiasm of the plants,while ignoring the huge gap between electricity bidding revenue and peak-shaving compensation,which is the main reasons for the Similarity of two kinds of scenarios.This paper provides a new idea for i mproving auxiliary service market in China.