Michael Lynch's Functionalist Theory Of Truth-on A Possible Functionalist Theory

The theory of truth theory presents the following three trends in the contemporary philosophy of language:(a)the substantive theories of truth has been challenged by the deflationism;(b)monism has been assaulted by the pluralism;(c)the philosophy of mind is enormously influential in the philosophy of language.As a response of the above trends,learning from the functionalism of philosophy of mind,Michael Lynch presents his functionalist theory of truth,which aims to the deflationist trend of pluralism theory.Lynch's theory has a considerable inspiration both on the development of deflationism and pluralism.With the help of the functionalism concpets,we can construct the possible framework connecting monism with pluralism.It's helpful for our new comprehension about the metaphysical properties of truth.As a result,we can solve the philosophical problems such as the universal semantic of truth and the cognitive function in a better way.In order to explain the validity of Lynch's theory and the metaphysical properties of truth further,,we reconstruct the functionalist theory of truth in a new way after our preparation in Chapter1 and chapter2.In Chapter3,we construct the consistent conceptual framework by defining universal concepts like "proposition","content","truth condition" a priori.Then we explain the core functionalist concepts of such as "true function","true features" in that framework.In chapter4,by logical deduction,we prove and show Lynch's principles,and we explain the propositional truth in different scopes.In chapter5,we compare and analyze different theories' interpretation path of propositional truth.Finally,in chapter6,we explore the metaphysical essence of functionalist theory of truth,and discuss its potentially ontological commitment and its limitations.We also attempt to propose an explanatory path based on the etymological method,which aims to reduce the theoretical risk of functionalist truth theory.