Evolutionary Game Analysis Between Local Governments And Power Generation Enterprises Based On Low-carbon Mechanism

With the rapid development of economy,China is facing serious energy consumption issues and environmental pollution,while China has become the biggest emitter of Carbon Dioxide in the world.The huge amount of carbon emissions is closely connected with the development of power industry,and the power industry is such a key area to carbon emissions that regulators can achieve effectively the overall goal of emission reduction by controlling emissions of power industry.In 2017,China will comprehensively start the construction of carbon trading market,in which regulators can control and slow down emissions from the electricity industry with market-oriented means,and this will possibly be an effective means to achieve sustainable development of economy and society in the future.The study of environmental issues is so complicated and the parties involved have limited rationality,so the traditional game theory cannot be well used to study the uncertainty of the evolutionary game process.Currently,researches on evolutionary game methods rarely involve analyzing emission reduction of the power industry,and even if some do,few take the carbon trading factors into consideration.This paper attempts to use the evolutionary game theory to analyze the interaction between local governments and power generation enterprises based on carbon trading mechanism.The article first introduces the background,the purpose and the value of the research,and then makes a summary of the research on the game in carbon emissions,carbon trading mechanism and game between governments and enterprises,which aims to explain that this research has both theoretical and practical significance.Secondly,the relevant theory is expounded,and so the theoretical basis for this study is established.In the third chapter,the article constructs the evolutionary game model based on Carbon Trading Mechanism,systematically analyzes the strategy selection and final evolution direction of local governments and power generation enterprises under different circumstances.Then the factors that influence the evolutionary results are discussed,and the next chapter gives relevant policy recommendations for regulators.In the research,it is found that there exist some different equilibrium in the evolution of the game system when the expected profits of enterprises are changing.Accordingly,in order to urge the power generation enterprises to consciously reduce carbon emissions,local governments need to take some measures,for example,governments should improve incentive to enterprises who actively abide emission reduction polices,increase carbon trading prices appropriately,reduce the variance of cost when local governments choose strict regulation or loose regulation,strengthen public supervision of the governments,and so on.