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Evolution Game Analysis Between Local Government And Tourism Enterprise

Posted on:2014-11-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2256330392973663Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Restricted by management and funding,many scenic spots have embarked on theranks to transfer the management rights.To develop scenic resources effectively,thetransfer of management has become a national trend.Although there are manysuccessful cases in the assignment of the managerial authority,but still many problemshad come forth,such as the unreasonable development of tourism scenic resources andenvironmental pollution,the losing and damaging of state assets.In order to avoidpunishment or to obtain preferential policies,tourism enterprises conduct rent-seekingactivities.the waste of social resources and corruption,and even some transfer planswere halfway aborted.With the improvement of attention on the assignment ofmanagerial authority of scenic and historical sites,the scholars began to introducegame theory to analyze related issues.The core game participants are localgovernments and tourism enterprises in this game.The specific game problemsinclude:whether tourism enterprises develop tourist resources legitimately or not;inorder to avoid punishment or to obtain preferential policies,whether tourismenterprises conduct rent-seeking activities or not;whether local governments takeeffective supervision on tourism enterprises’ unreasonable development of scenic andhistorical sites or not;whether the person in charge of the local governmentdecision-making bribe for their short-term political achievements and personal gain ornot;and so on.Based on the modern property rights theory,rent-seeking theory and evolutionarygame theory,the paper takes the analysis about the necessity and feasibility as thestarting point, it also surveys the problems in the assignment of managerial authorityof scenic and historical sites and builds up the evolutionary game models between thelocal governments and the tourism enterprises,then analyzes the their behaviorstrategies and explores their dominant strategy portfolios by taking the method ofreplicator dynamics equation and evolutionary stable strategy.Finally,the paperexplores the conditions required by the dominant strategy portfolio and then putsforward the corresponding policy recommendations,which can provide theoretical andpractical guidances for the developing and planning of scenic and historical sites inthe future.
Keywords/Search Tags:tourism enterprises, local governments, rent-seeking theory, property rightstheory, evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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