The "Resistance" Of The Client:A Study On The Action Strategy Of The Peasants In The Situation Of Collective Assets Being Encroached

The study of peasant resistance has often been examined and analyzed in the perspective of the relationship between "peasant-nation" in order to explore the political significance of the peasant resistance.And the reason why these studies have intentionally or unintentionally used the "peasant-state" perspective is directly related to the situation in which the phenomenon of peasant resistance is observed.The peasantry attacks investigated by these institutes often occur in national policies and government actions involving taxation or land issues,and the peasantry's resistance is triggered by the peasantry's interests.In this resistance,the peasant is clearly as a citizen's identity,in order to maintain or strive for a civil rights,and the existing interests of the pattern or political order to show dissatisfaction.However,the peasantry prevent the village cadres to private the collective assets,which is a resistance as a client.This kind of resistance often occurs mainly between the villagers and the village cadres,the state or the government are rarely as the main roles involved,so it should be explored its social and economic significance?In this paper,through a field survey of a rural suburb of Sichuan,the use of participatory observation and unstructured interview method to collect and research topics related to qualitative material.On the basis of collating and analyzing the material,this paper explores the action option of the peasants on the privatization of village cadres by using the perspective of principal-agent theory.The article regards the rural collective property rights as the social contract between the villagers and the village cadres based on certain social expectation,and the villagers and the village cadres formed a certain principal-agent relationship.Villagers collectively as the owner of collective assets and enjoy the right of assets and supervision,so it is a role of the principal;village cadres on behalf of the villagers to manage the collective assets,exercise a certain decision-making power,so the actual is an agent Character.Due to the inconsistency of the objective function,the asymmetry of information and the incompleteness of the contract,the principal is faced with a certain agency risk,and the privatization of the village cadres(agents)to the collective assets is a serious agencyrisk.The author learned that in the practice of the village for many years,the village cadres privatized the problem of collective assets have occurred,which often will be based on the type of collective assets to choose a different means of privatization,the legitimacy of these means exist Certain difference.In the face of the agency risk of the privatization of the collective assets of the brigade cadres,the villagers as the principal of the villagers have shown a certain degree of complexity in their choice: almost always choose "indisputable" in the collective assets of the production brigade,but in the collective assets of the production team selectively choose preventing and resistance.Through the analysis,it is found that the villagers' dissatisfaction with the privatization behavior of the agent brigade cadres is actually the result of the relationship between the action cost and the income.When the cost of the resistance is higher than the income,the villagers tend to choose the compromise and concessions;and when the cost of resistance is lower than the proceeds,tend to choose to stop the fight.And the degree of differentiation between the client group(the villagers)and the amount of the privatization of the agent constitute the basis cost and the base benefit of the action.In the collective assets of the production brigade and the collective assets of the production team,the two elements have different combinations,which means that the principal(villagers)to prevent the basic cost of action and basic relationship between the income relationship is also different,resulting in differences in action options.In addition,the collective assets of the production brigade and team-level collective assets actually existence of two different agency structure,in the team-level collective assets in the existence of "intermediary agent" mechanism,which is actually a client(villagers)action to increase or decrease the cost of action.This mechanism will tend to raise or reduce the cost of action of the principal on the basis of the original relationship between the cost and benefit of the client(the villagers),so that the original resistance cost and the income relationship change,so that the principal option of action for private behavior is more complicated.