The Application Of Game Theory In EPC Mode Of International Engineering

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy in our country, the international engineering has become an important way for the domestic construction enterprises to achieve the new profit growth, in which the EPC as a main international engineering contracting mode, to a certain extent, solve the conflict among the design, procurement and construction, which implements a good control of the whole project's schedule, cost and quality, but there are some theoretical problems in practical application remaining to be further solved. As an important theory in the field of economics, Game Theory is applied to the EPC international engineering field. On the premise of the fixed construction contract Price, through the game analysis among the owners, owners' representatives and international engineering general contractor, we can realize relevant interest maximization of three players. At present, the Game Theory research concentrated on EPC international engineering is mainly in a certain stage, such as bidding, and game analysis is limited in the two sides of the game. In EPC international engineering, each stage has the continuity and correlation, game analysis only for single phase is not comprehensive.In order to better carry out EPC international engineering, this paper uses the Game Theory, under the constraint of FIDIC construction contract, to carried on the game analysis on the EPC international project bidding, construction management, claim stages for the owners, the owners' representative and the general contractor. The concrete research content is as follows:In the bidding stage of EPC international engineering, the incomplete information static game model between the owner and general contractor is established. By using the Bayes theorem, we derived the relevant posterior probability formula and verified the mechanism of wining the bid with the lowest price. Through solving the expected utility function of the general contractor, we get the bidding strategies of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, prove the uniqueness of the solution, and then analyzed the influence of parameters such as bidders on the bidding price strategy, which provides data support for the general contractor to increase the chances of winning.In the construction management stage, the both sides and three sides incomplete information dynamic repeated games model between the owner and general contractor, owner and owner representative, general contractor and owner representative was established. Using Harsanyi transformation and introducing the time discount factor, we derived the relevant expected utility function formula, got the sub-game refining Nash equilibrium of engineering quality control and analyzed the influence of model parameters such as the supervision cost on the equilibrium solution, which provides the basis for owner to determine whether a general contractor occurred rent-seeking behaviors or cheat on workmanship and materials.In the claiming stage, according to the FIDIC claim terms and procedures, the complete information dynamic game model between the owner and general contractor was established. Firstly, we made the bargaining game analysis, by using reverse induction, got the expected claim amount of both sides, and also analyzed the influence of time discount factor on the claim amount. On this basis, we made the game analysis of claim dispute settlement, derived both sides' expected utility function expression, and got the probability of general contractor applying for arbitration, which provides a numerical reference for general contractor.As for incentive and restrictive mechanism, a special complete information dynamic game, we tried to make the preliminary design of the incentive contract. According to owner's expected utility function, using the certainty equivalence principle, the expected utility function expressions of the general contractor was derived, the optimization problem of the incentive contract, using reverse induction method, and the question of the optimization of incentive contracts was obtained. Using backward induction, we obtained the optimal incentive coefficient of the owner and the optimal effort level of the general contractor, which provides certain reference for the owner to design the incentive mechanism.