Global Climate Cooperation Countermeasure Analysis And Simulation Research

Global climate cooperation has become one of the most significant problems in the world, however, Copenhagen conference and Durban conference got limited results. How global climate change will evolve depends closely on the carrying out of global climate cooperation in post-Kyoto era. Therefore, it is significant to use the game theory to study the problem of global climate cooperation, by which not only key factors that affect cooperation will be studied, but also the dynamic evolution process of cooperation will be explored.In this paper, a game model of global climate cooperation has been set up by using the two-stage cooperation game based on the abstraction of the current global climate cooperation problem. The best decision-making rules are analyzed respectively when every country choose cooperation or non-cooperation in the first stage. Based on the calculations, the cooperative strategies, the optimal carbon emissions, as well as the minimum emission reduction costs are discussed when the key influencing factors are homogenous or heterogeneous, i.e., carbon mitigation cost, carbon emissions in the BAU scenario and the loss parameter.The equilibrium conditions of the climate cooperation game have been further demonstrates based on the discussion. The equilibrium conditions are deduced from two perspectives, one is when none of the cooperation countries become non-cooperative from cooperative, and the other is when none of the non-cooperation countries become cooperative from non-cooperative. The key influencing factors of the global climate cooperation equilibrium solution are analyzed. It's demonstrated that the equilibrium solution has nothing to do with carbon emissions under BAU scenario.Based on the theoretical analysis, the evolutionary game of the multiple players through has been simulated by using NetLogo software. The dynamical evolution process of the global climate cooperation is studied, and particularly, the cooperation evolution process is simulated when the mitigation costs and loss parameters are heterogeneous. Base on the simulation, it's revealed that the strategy update process will affect equilibrium results. Different evolutionary results of the global climate cooperation in different updating strategies are analyzed.