Game Analysis Of Credit Risk Compensation Mechanism For SMEs

In the past two years,with the increase economic downward pressure,to further strengthen the economic development environment of hard constraints,our countries continue to reform the economic development mode,from the previous elements driving development mode gradually converted into the innovation driven development model,take a path of an intensive development and high-tech development,to fit the national conditions of our country in order to build up the characteristics of a new country.Most technological SMEs have the characteristics of scientific and technological innovation,this group working to create new technology,products and services,increase its products market demand and competitive in domestic and international,is the main driving force of building an innovation oriented country.But since the birth of technology-based SMEs,had endured shortage of funds and difficulty of financing problems.This is due to the features of high business risks of high-tech SMEs in our country at present,its security capacity is weak,information asymmetry,restricting the growth of SMEs.In order to alleviate the SME financing problem,Ministry of science and technology and other ministries “guide the banking financial institutions to increase the credit of SMEs”,the policy advice.The establishment of the technological SMEs loan risk compensation mechanism become important financial means to encourage and guide the banks to further increase the credit to technological SMEs support is put forward.The principle of technological SMEs loan risk compensation mechanism is,government fiscal funds and financial institutions funds effectively combined financial institutions to SMEs credit risk assessed,together for the technological SMEs financing through obstacles.Firstly,in the perspective of the current SME Technology Innovation,analyzed the quasi-public goods characteristic of SME technology innovation,and the SME credit market failure mechanism.And from credit rationing theory knowable,relying solely on market forces for spontaneous adjustment,the SMEs credit rationing phenomenon cannot solve.In order to achieve the maximization of social welfare,technological SMEs credit market failure need efficient government intervention.Therefore,this paper will put government intervention in the SME financing market,adapted option game theory as the theoretical basis of the study,the loan risk compensation mechanism more involved in the game behavior of the subject of microscopic analysis.In particularly,by establishing two models: the game model of between the cooperation and banks,and the evolutionary game model between banks and enterprises.The game behavior assumption of the individual rational rose to collective rationality,from the realization of the maximum social welfare perspective,established the game model of the cooperation between the bank and the government.Show that the cooperative game model,will be the sum of net income expected silver enterprises of three party as a whole,to achieve optimal alliance overall revenue,improve the level of social welfare.Evolutionary game model between the SMEs and bank,it is in two dimensions: “the risk of technology innovation” and “efforts to verify after loan”,considering the evolutionary process of bank lending to companies,and enterprise for borrowing strategy choice,from the micro level to explains the banks and enterprises.in the process of financing behavior.Finally,respectively from the different participants,in the perspective of proposed optimization suggestion on the technological SMEs loan risk compensation,in order to provide reference to establish the technological SMEs loan risk compensation policy system to adapt the present situation of our country...