Analysis Of Cooperative Innovation Behavior Between Enterprises In Industrial Cluster

Along with the economic development, industrial cluster plays a more and moreimportant role in this context. It will be the same industry or similar industry enterprisetogether, produce enormous economies of scale and scope economic effect. Theknowledge spillover effect of cooperative innovation between enterprises and the regionalbrand effect produced by enterprises gathered brought many advantages for everyenterprise in industrial cluster promote regional core competitiveness. Therefore givenenough attention by both developed countries and developing countries, the industrialcluster is constantly increasing the strength has also been rising.Technological innovation is an inexhaustible motive force for the development ofindustrial clusters. Therefore, how to improve the technological innovation capability isthe key to the rapid development of industrial clusters has become resolved. With thedeepening of the industrial layout in the global scope and the refining of social division oflabor, the form of refinement has also changed. For the purpose of control the risk andshortening the development cycle，R&D methods developed from within the organizationturned to external collaborative research. Inter-enterprise cooperation and innovation hasgradually become the main way of technological innovation.The article reviews the research cluster theory and the theory of cooperativeinnovation. Describes the relationship between industrial clusters rooted resistance andreciprocal cooperation between enterprises and behavior. Subsequently, establish a gamemodel between the two enterprises as the mainstay of the business cooperation. Thearticles using evolutionary game theory reach cooperative behavior of enterprises.The results show that the knowledge spillover, knowledge protection, and clusterembeddedness have important influence on cluster evolution direction.①When positiverevenue gains from cluster embeddedness, knowledge spillovers, IPR protection less thanadditional revenue gains from opportunistic behavior, the cluster members will avoidcooperative R&D to independent R&D or stop R&D, the system will go into the"prisoner’s dilemma" model;②When positive revenue gains from cluster embeddedness,knowledge spillovers, IPR protection more than additional revenue gains fromopportunistic behavior, the cluster members will be actively involved in the cooperativeR&D, the system will be out of the “prisoner’s dilemma", achieve a win-win situation;③Knowledge effect, protection of intellectual property rights, and cluster embeddedness between the above two, the direction of system evolution depends on the game both sidesinitial state. Finally, the article from the prospective of government、the cluster、enterpriseproposes the policy recommendations on how to promote technological innovation andcooperation among enterprises in the industrial cluster.