Micro-game Research On The Introduction Of Low-carbon Environmentally Friendly Technologies, Collaborative Innovation And Innovation Diffusion

The sustainable development of human civilization has suffered the severe challenge of global climate change,which is a common threat for human beings.[1-2]Transfer and diffusion of low-carbon environmentally-friendly technology(LCEFT)is an important means to cope with climate change.Under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change,mechanisms like funding mechanism and clean development mechanism(CDM)are gradually introduced and implemented,though the outcome is not that satisfactory.To facilitate the transfer and diffusion of LCEFT to address climate change remains the difficult topic arousing foreign and domestic concerns.Enterprises in developing country are playing an indispensable role in coping with the climate change.Since the implementation of international transfer mechanisms is far from the expectation,and it is a general weakness to deal with climate change,these enterprises are in great demand for LCEFT and need continual adoption.Meanwhile,those enterprises with improved technology via international transfer,are subject to intellectual property protection mechanism and cannot accomplish the technological diffusion,regardless of their role in the mitigation of greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions.More importantly,international transfer poses an obstacle for the enterprises accessing to cutting-edge technology and there is still a gap to the developed countries.Therefore,LCEFT innovation becomes the inevitable choice.In addition,enterprises in developing country have a reluctant will toward existing LCEFT diffusion and adoption.Innovative diffusion is in a dilemma.On the whole,there are three challenges that confront the enterprises in developing country:?The introduced price of LCEFT;?LCEFT innovation;?LCEFT innovation diffusion.The solution to the above three challenges is of great significance to cope with the climate change.The stakeholders involved in the three challenges include:the government,the intermediary,financial institution,potential adoption enterprise and diffusion enterprise.These parties are partners and competitors in terms of LCEFT introduction,innovation and innovative diffusion.In essence,it is a game problem.Thus,it is of advantages that we adopt a mathematic model to simulate the conflict and cooperation among rational decision makers,and the game theory that has widely and deeply changed the thinking modes of economists.This research focuses on the behavioral motives of the stakeholders in the introduction,innovation and diffusion,and adopts the bargaining model and evolutionary game model to conduct the study.(1)A bargaining model is introduced in LCEFT transfer of enterprises in developing country.According to the fact that game players in the negotiation share common value and common sense but are different in the shouldering pressure of emission reduction,we use parameters like emission reduction pressure and temporal discounting to build a bargaining model of complete iinformation and incomplete information of asymmetric psychological pressure to investigate the effecting mechanism of information and psychological pressure on the bargaining policy of enterprises and to explore the bargaining strategy of enterprises in the negotiation of technological introduction.(2)A collaborative innovation evolutionary game study is conducted in LCEFT transfer of enterprises in developing country.Based on the wide collaborative relations of enterprises,we firstly introduce parameters like innovation cost,extra cost of collaborative innovation and extra benefit,to build a collaborative innovation game model of production,education and scientific research under collaborative relations of enterprises,and analyze the effects of each parameter on the systematic evolution of this model.On this basis,a green financial innovative mechanism of carbon pledge is firstly proposed,and motives of financial institutions,the governiment and enterprises are investigated.Then,a multi-party evolutionary game model of the government,industries,universities,scientific research and financial institutions is constructed to decompose the systematic evolutionary features with the participation of financial institutions.Finally,suggestions are provided in accordance with the simulation outcome.(3)An evolutionary game study of LCEFT innovation and diffusion is conducted in enterprises in developing country.? To cope with the conflict and interest of diffusion enterprise and adoption enterprise,we introduce parameters such as LCEFT synergy effect coefficient,technological complementarity,and technolog,ical spillover risk,and build two evolutionary game models of LCEFT innovation and diffusion with and without the intermediary,to explore stipulations of the government on the intermediary market and incentives of LCEFT innovation for the enterprises.? As with the decision-making problem of potential adoption enterprise,the evolutionary game model is adopted to investigate the game playing of enterprises adopting LCEFT innovation under the market mechanism and carbon emission reduction mechanism.Effects of carbon pricing,carbon quota,initial carbon credit and carbon tax on enterprises to adopt LCEFT innovation are analyzed.Furthermore,a more fair incentive and punitive mechanism is presented to lure potential adoption enterprises to adopt LCEFT innovation.Based on above research contents,we come to conclusions as follows.(1)Enterprises in the developing countries should control the psychology of speculation or "hitchhiking".Instead,they should take positive attitudes towards current international policies and advance the negotiation process of LCEFT transfer to actively import LCEFT.Enterprises in the developing country adopt a basic bargaining strategy of "cutting the price half' when having a negotiation of the introduction price with contenders in developed countries.(2)Reduction of the uncertainty of LCEFT innovation risk and benefit is conducive to the accumulation of corporate profit,which will lay a more solid funding base and talents team for future LCEFT re-innovation and the enhancement of core competency.(3)As with government sectors,it is vital of LCEFT innovation to build a platform among industries,universities and researches,and business incubator,formulate a valid incentive mechanism and lower the innovation cost of mutual cooperation.R&D subsidy from the government is an important means to improve industry-university-research collaboration and reduce the collaborative cost.(4)Enterprise A and enterprise B or another institution will make complementation in collaboration,forming a situation of“1+1>2" and generating a cooperative surplus effect,which provides a more favorable benefit for each party in the cooperation.It.is the direct momentum for the game subject to make cooperative innovation.The higher expectation the cooperative enterprise has towards LCEFT cooperative surplus,the more positive it will be in the collaborative process.(5)The involvement of financial institution in effect can enhance the cooperative innovation.They play a positive role in implementing green credit policy,and assist enterprises in accessing green credit support via means like carbon pledge,which aims to build a favorable credit ecological environment for enterprises,and strengthen the cooperative innovation between enterprises and another cooperative party.(6)Polices like the construction of cooperative innovation center or platform,intermediary market development support and innovation subsidy will actively promote LCEFT cooperative innovation.But it is not an ideal equilibrium strategy.The key leading role of the government and the leverage power of financial institution are important as well.(7)The proportional parameter of technological complementation exerts a positive diffusion on LCEFT.A larger complementation indicates a stronger driving force for innovative diffusion.(8)Incentives of the government can hardly ensure the technological diffusion among enterprises.LCEFT diffusion requires a strict restriction mechanism in the whole industry to foster a good-standing alliance for combating against speculation or hitchhiking in LCEFT.(9)The government's incentive policies help enterprises to make diffusion decisions.But the power of incentives should not be too conservative in case enterprises will take the decision of "no diffusion".These incentive policies need improvement.Singular incentive seldom helps to realize LCEFT diffusion.Joint incentives lead to a larger bonus,and give more attractions to enterprises,which will lead enterprises to actively involved in LCEFT innovation diffusion and it will be more easier for the intermediary institution to participate in LCEFT innovation.(10)Government sectors make not only incentives to guide enterprises,but also punitive measures to normalize the intermediary market,lead them to providing excellent LCEFT innovation diffusion service to achieve mutual win.(11)Because the intermediary institution has particular expertise and information advantages in participation,we can make effective evaluation of its role and value in LCEFT.It can reduce the risk of adoption and lower the diffusion risk of diffusion enterprises,which can further help to realize true value and functions of LCEFT and achieve the cooperative effect of“1 + 1>2”.(12)Carbon tax system and incentives can make a favorable synergy and complementation.A mixed emission reduction system is helpful to realize social equality.Carbon tax income increase is carried out on the premise of controlling the total amount in carbon fair market.The enterprise should afford corresponding expensive carbon tax of excessive emission amount.In this way,the control over the total of carbon emission and its role in leading enterprises in the transformation and upgrade can be ensured,which thereby helps to realize the target of sustainable development.