Supply Chain Fairness Coordination Of Agri-production Under Random Yield And Power Structure

Since 2004,the state has promulgated first policy documents about the issue of 'Three rural' for 14 years consecutively,which means that the development of agricultural plays a more important role in the new situation.Hence,the research on supply chain of agricultural products has become the focus in recent years.The first document in 2017 considered increasing farmers' income and ensuring supply effective as the main objectives of supply-side structural reform.However,the actuality in the operation of the agricultural products supply chain is that the farmers cost a huge expense,while incomes are extremely low,and the firm get high profits for processing only.It essentially reflects the unfair distribution in profit,which will induce the failure of transactions,breakdown of the relationship between members easily,and is not conducive to the coordination of supply chain.In addition,with the natural attributes and the characteristics of vulnerable to affected by weather,environment,and natural disasters,agricultural products always get yield random in the production process.Therefore,the research on how to establish a fair coordination of the agricultural products supply chain with yield random is of important practical significance for increasing farmers'income,ensuring supply effective and sustainable development of agriculture.Then,we studied the problem of fairness coordination of agricultural products supply chain with yield random depends on power structure from the perspective of increasing the income of farmers,and ensuring the supply effective.1 The impact of yield random and power structure on the decision-making and performance of supply chain members when farmer is fair neutrality.Combined with the structure diversification of agricultural products supply chain in China,we used a game theory to model power in a supply chain with random yield and examine how random yield and power structure affected supply chain member's decision-making and performance.We demonstrate that:1)whether the farmer and retailer benefit from its power depends on the random yield.2)With a power farmer(or Nash),the farmer's order decision affected by yield random related to the farmer's marginal profit,and the yield random always undermines the performances of farmer,retailer and the entire supply chain in the additive stock and multiplicative stock cases.3)With a power retailer,the farmer and retailer's order decision and the performances of retailer affected by yield random related to the retailer's marginal profit in the additive stock and multiplicative stock cases.2 The coordination of agricultural products supply chain with yield random and power structure when farmer is fairness preference.We used the game and fairness theory to model fairness preference in supply chain with random yield and power structure,and then examine how fairness parameters affected supply chain member's decision-making and performance.We demonstrate that:1)with a power farmer(or Nash),the farmer is not benefits from its fairness preference,on the contrary,the farmess preference always undermines the performances of farmer,retailer and the entire supply chain.2)With a power retailer,the retailer changed order strategy under appropriate reference standards and proper fairness preferences of farmer,which made the farmer's performances increasing,achieved a more fair trade,and then the supply chain could achieve coordination.