Research On Coordination Of Order-based Agricultural Products Supply Chain Based On Quality Investment

The report of the 19 th National Congress pointed out that the main contradictions in our society have been transformed into contradictions between the people's growing needs for a better life and the development of inadequate imbalances.With the advancement of agricultural modernization,"the main contradiction of China's agriculture has changed from a lack of total products to a structural contradiction." People's ideas of agricultural product consumption has gradually shifted from quantitative to qualitative.Under the background of the transformation of major contradictions and growth momentum in agriculture,"the shortage of China's agricultural production quality supply are increasingly prominent,and the effective supply capacity is insufficient." How to improve the quality supply capacity of China's agricultural production has become an important issue of agricultural industrialization development.A large number of studies have shown that contract farming is conducive to solving the problem of agricultural product quality information asymmetry,reducing farmers' market risk and improving farmers' utility.Therefore,agricultural product supply chain management under contract farming is an important way to comprehensively improve the quality of agricultural products.At the same time,according to the theory of asset specificity,the quality investment in the agricultural product supply chain has the characteristics of special investment.In order to avoid the risk,the quality investment of contract farming will be insufficient,resulting in low stability and low profit in the supply chain.To this end,this paper considers the way in which the company grants quality investment subsidies to farmers,improves the quality-specific investment of both companies and farmers,and the credibility of long-term cooperation commitments,thereby improving the stability of the supply chain and improving the profit of the supply chain.This paper constructs a theoretical analysis framework of “supply chain quality investment incentive-supply chain transaction environment-supply chain participant psychological behavior-supply chain contract design”,and studies the quality investment subsidy mechanism of order-based agricultural product supply chain.Consider the agricultural product quality investment incentives and supply chain coordination under the three conditions of agricultural product yield demand determination,random yield and random demand.The main content of the paper includes the following three parts.First of all,through the discussion of the research background and the combing of relevant literature,the scientific issues of this paper are summarized and refined,and the theoretical analysis framework of this paper is constructed.Second,aim at the thee trading environment of yield and demand determination,random yield,and random demand,respectively design specific quality investment subsidies contract of supply chain,and further carry out coordination contract design under the fairness preference,study the the impact of farmer's fair psychological behavior on the supply chain decisions.Finally,the results of theoretical model analysis are verified,adjusted and corrected by applying multi-case analysis method based on the first-hand data of field interviews,and relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward on this basis.The main conclusions of the study are as follows:(1)Under the three trading environments,the quality investment subsidies can improve the company's profits and make the quality level achieving optimum in the system.In the three types of trading environment where the yield demand is determined,the yield is random,and the demand is random,the company's subsidy for the quality investment of the farmers can increase the profits of the company while the profits of the farmers are not affected.At the same time,the quality level of the supply chain under the investment subsidy contract can reach the optimal level of the system under centralized decision-making.(2)Under different trading environments and psychological behaviors,the subsidy rate of the company's quality investment to farmers has different change rule.Under the random yield of agricultural products,the higher the out-of-stock penalty paid by farmers,the higher the degree of customization of agricultural products and the stronger the perishability,the higher the company's investment subsidy rate.Under the random demand for agricultural products,the lower the spot price of agricultural products and the higher the multi-period selling price after slow sales,the higher the investment subsidy rate the company should give to farmers.In the three trading environments,the higher the quality sensitivity of consumers,the lower the quality investment cost of farmers,and the lower the wholesale price,the higher the investment subsidy rate given by the company to farmers.(3)In the supply chain investment subsidy contract,the farmer's fair preference not only has an impact on farmers' profits,but also on company profits and market demand.In the investment subsidy contract,the farmer's fair preference can not only bring about the increase of farmers' profits,but also lead to the decline of the company's profits.Therefore,companies that pursue short-term interests will not be willing to cooperate with farmers with fair preferences.If the quality investment cost is high or the wholesale price is low,the farmer's fair preference will be able to expand the market demand for agricultural products.At this time,companies that pursue long-term interests should pay attention to and satisfy the fairness preference of farmers.If the quality investment cost is low and the wholesale price is high,farmers should not pursue fairness,at this time,the company should not cooperate with farmers who pursue fairness.(4)Under the random demand of agricultural products,the quality investment subsidy mechanism can improve the profit of the company while improving the stability of the agricultural product supply chain.In the wholesale contract of agricultural product supply chain under random demand,the cooperation relationship between the company and the farmers is unstable.After the introduction of the quality investment subsidy mechanism,the cooperation space between the company and the farmers will be expanded,so that the stability of the supply chain will be improved,and the profits of the company and the supply chain will also be improved.(5)In the supply chain under the bilateral self-interest preference,the company should try to reduce the stock-out penalties for farmers.When the agricultural products encounter poor sales,both the company and the farmers should increase their residual value.In the supply chain under the bilateral self-interest preference,with random yield or random demand,farmers and companies should increase their residual value when the agricultural products are facing slow sales.With bilateral self-interest preference,the supply chain contract under random yield,the profits of the company and the farmers are negatively related to the stock-out penalties of agricultural products,so the company should try to reduce the stock-out penalties collected from farmers.The possible innovations of this paper include:(1)Studying the endogenous decision-making of the quality investment subsidy rate under the three trading environments discussed and the different psychological behaviors of the farmers;(2)Studying the quantitative impact of farmers' fair psychological behavior on farmers and the company's supply chain decision under the two kinds of trading conditions: yield and demand determination and random yield;(3)In the agricultural product supply chain under random demand,the relationship between the specificity of quality investment and the stability of supply chain is theoretically verified.