Analysis Of Russia's Economic Statecraft Strategy Towards Georgia

The current research is a deep study of Economic Statecraft strategy of Russia towards Georgia.As its makeshift tool,Russia was using this strategy for pursuing several goals on the international arena,and the main one was influence on Georgian foreign policy decisions.As the XXIst century is the period of division of the world into different kinds of powers,we can be witnessing political games between all of them.Risk taken by each of the state,used tools and consequences of all the actions vary from one case to another.In this thesis I will be elaborating case when Big power – Russia-could not accept regime change in the Small power – Georgia-which initially was part of it,and even afterwards,when Soviet Union collapsed,still somehow depended on it.Primarily,Russian aim was not to let regime change in Georgia damage its relations with “big neighbor” or “big brother”.However,the game itself was started by Georgian new government,which in 2003 decided that friendly relations with ‘big brother' lead small regional country to precipice of Communist past,reflecting on internal and external course of Georgia.In the introduction part researcher gives historical review of Russia-Georgian Relations.Revealing in-depth analysis of bilateral relations over the years,researcher is explaining why and the economic statecraft took place.In Russian interest in Georgia and position of Georgia for Russian and other powers is thoroughly explained in the next chapters.Different factors which force Russia to keep Georgia as its sphere of influence,are separately studied and analyzed.Last chapters will make the reader acquainted with the theoretical framework of thesis and cases of Economic Statecraft of Russia.Afterwards,researcher is showing the effects of economic sanctions imposed by Russia on the economy of Georgia and the ways Georgia was facing and fighting diplomatic and economic difficulties during and after statecraft policy.And the conclusion part represents summary of all the research: consequences and results of statecraft for both sides.The aim of the current study is to research how one power is able to influence another power's political decisions without using direct force,but coming up with the use of economic tools.This thesis is focused on the reasons leading Russia to “damage” Georgian economy and on the consequences of this “peaceful” statecraft strategy.From one point of view,Georgia is a small regional state which,actually,would be easy to influence without any kind of damage.But while going to the details of bilateral relation,we can see that Georgia means something not only for Russia,but also for other Big powers.De facto,we have right to say that only small powers tend to become victims in all rounds of political games and bear extensive losses.Not infrequently,small powers have no other options due to the lack of tools making it possible to resist upcoming attacks.In this case,it is becoming more than possible to “harm” victim side and again prove its inability to fight with the bigger power.However,there are unique incidents,when small regional power,in spite of conceding and giving up,was deciding to fight and withstand till the end,no matter what consequences can be.As we can witness in Georgia,new government did not take a bow in front of its “big brother.On the contrary,it decided to totally change its FP direction and was looking forward to finding new opportunities with new,maybe stronger and more reliable partners – Western,in our case.There are only two ways possible for Big power: either to wholly give up,or to fight till the end and make new partnership integration unbearable for a small power.Supposing that Russia would had been giving up on one of the important states of the region could not even seem possible.So,as the result,we have been witnessing how Russia was hardening Georgian economy and was intensively trying to hinder its moving towards new horizons with US and EU.Especially hard it becomes when outcomes of Russian actions are appearing in ‘economic” shapes: damaging economy of Georgia by embargoes,sanctions,diverse economic blockades.Economic statecraft policy is considered as one of the most “working”,“useful” tools of controlling or proving influence of one state over another.ES is predominantly based on national interest of its implementer.In his turn,implementer is achieving two goals at the same time: forces “victim” state to take into consideration Big Power's primary interests.Secondly,it is also proving its strength on the international arena.To what extent ES policy was successful or failing is always being able to say after a couple of years due to its linkage with economic indicators.In any case,no matter which kind of industries were damaged – economic losses never cost low.In general sense,building a strategy of using economic means is not a complex process.Development of ES strategy actually depends both on the state practicing this policy and on side which being damaged by it.More concretely,the harsher are responds on sanctions,the harsher will be the next step of ES implementer.For Russia,there could be nothing more important than obedience and loyalty by post-Soviet states which should have included understanding and accepting “special” role of Big Power in the region(especially,its economic power).Losing ties even with one of those countries can only mean losing influence in region,which can lead to deprivation of the “Great Power” status.Significant role of any FP actions I this work also belongs to ruling government of each of the state.In both of our examples,Russia and Georgia,it is possible to notice that while in one state changing of powers does not mean FP change,in other it plays crucial role for both domestic and external stability.Russian FP was remaining still and steadfast towards its neighbors and other close and far powers.However,deep and serious regime changes took place only in Georgia.To be more laconic and concrete,after Soviet Union collapsed,most of presidents were pursuing neutral FP position in order not to damage Georgian and regional peace.But how long could one small but very agile European country get stick on “Russian” ideas – was just the question of time.The most propelling ideas of transformation of Georgia was consisted of new reforms and reorganizations leading to combat corruption and common crime,which new authorities were considering as unneeded remains of communist past.It was also important to attract foreign investment in order to accelerate economic development,so remaining dependent on Russia could not be a priority any more.So,with revolutionist Saakashvili's coming to power,new government was aiming at creation and stressing totally new priorities both on an external and domestic levels.Even though Georgian side was realizing all possible risks and consequences,it did not stop peaceful revolution and anti-Russian actions,which seemed(for Georgian people)to influence general wellbeing of the whole country.The core of all Georgian problems– Economic Statecraft policy by Russia – started just a year after Rose Revolution-in the end of 2004.Behavior of Georgian government and responses on all the embargoes,bans and sanctions was kind of forcing Russia to use even harder means step by step.Georgian side made decision to wholly depart Russian “patronage” and,as it seemed,was ready to bear all kind of losses,but as the result,it only damaged its economy and damaged general condition of the Georgian people inside the country and in Russia as well.The main purpose of this work is to reveal how much these Economic Statecraft measures are capable of frightening one of the “players” of world FP or to what extent they are able to force the “player” to move away from the intended goal.The case of Russia and Georgia is one of the rarest cases where all form of statecraft were used but observations and analysis of ES strategy and several historical facts gave unexpected results.