Research On The Coordination Of Low-carbon Supply Chain Under Altruism Preference

Global warming caused low energy consumption,low pollution and low emission concept for the development of low carbon economy,which is a challenge to the traditional supply chain only in the pursuit of economic efficiency.In recent years,supply chain management based on carbon emissions gradually becomes a hot research,which is a contribution to improve the competitiveness of the supply chain,as well as economic and environmental benefits.Under this background,after reviewing relative studies which concerned on low carbon supply chain coordination,customers' low carbon preference and altruistic preference and its effects on decision-making and coordination of supply chain,game theory was applied to build the analyzing model,which expanded the theory of low carbon supply chain contract coordination and helped explain the reality more accuracy,and then,some relative conclusions was drawn,which would favor the utilization of the wholesale price contract coordination supply chain and guide the practice of low-carbon supply chain management more scientifically.The stem of the paper and the important conclusions are as following.(1)The decision-making model of low carbon supply chain considering altruism under the wholesale price contract.This decision-making model was used to analyze the deep effects of altruistic preference on the decision making and coordination of low carbon supply chain.Found that,the retailers prefer to have cooperative ties with those low carbon manufacturers,and,to a certain degree,the retailers' preference of altruism will encourage manufacturers to invest more in carbon emission reduction.Due to this,manufacturers give priority to the cooperation with those retailers who are altruistic.When the manufacture confronted with the pressure of carbon emission reduction,the retailer should undertake the obligation of the whole supply chain's utility and promote the increase of utilities of supply chain system.Retailers should not only consider their own utilities,but also should take manufacturers' utilities into consideration.However,under the wholesale price contract,whether if the retailer or the manufacturer has the altruistic behavior,it does not change the coordination of the traditional supply chain.Namely,the supply chain cannot be coordinated.(2)Based on altruism and wholesale price contract to research the coordination of low-carbon supply chains under the scenario of customers' low-carbon preference.In this part,the effects of decision makers' altruistic preference on the final decision-making and coordination of low-carbon supply chains under the consumers' low-carbon preference were further studied.And found that: the low-carbon preference of consumers will promote the altruistic cooperation of manufacturers and retailers,and,at the same time,the manufacturers are encouraged to invest more in carbon reduction and finally realize the true ‘low carbon'.Under the low-carbon preference of consumers,the low-carbon preference of retailers will to a certain extent promote more investment of manufacturers in carbon reduction,which will upgrade the enterprises community image,improve product sales and realize the increase of interests of both sides.Therefore,under the background of low carbon,priorities should be given to inspire the altruistic preference of retailers,as that the carbon reduction rate will be increased greatly.(3)Low-carbon supply chain coordination considering altruism and asymmetric information under the contract of the wholesale price.Due to asymmetric information of the degree of altruistic preference,the game between retailers and manufacturers were divided in to five stages according to the degree of information perfection and rationality of retailers' altruistic preference.Moreover,the effects of retailers' altruistic behaviors on decision-making of low-carbon supply chains were also studied in this part.The results indicate that,in the fourth stage of the game,when the information of altruistic preference of retailers is equal to the information the manufacturers recognized,namely information perfect,the carbon reduction rate reaches the maximum value.At the same time,the profits of manufacturers and supply chain respectively reach a maximum,and are greater than the traditions.However,when retailers veiling the information of their altruistic preference,there will be a decrease of manufacturers' and supply chains' profits,and will be lower than the traditions.Meanwhile,the profit of retailers will increase,but still smaller than the traditional supply chain,the first stage of the game.