Research On The Impact Of The Difference In Equity Incentive Motivation Of The GEM Executives On Corporate Performance

Since 2005,China's equity incentive system has been on the road to normalization,the effect of equity incentive system of listed companies has attracted wide attention.In the process of carrying out equity incentive plan of Listed Companies in China,the non incentive phenomenon,such as short validity period of equity incentive and loose right conditions,has been shown in succession.In the process of practice,the system of equity incentive can not sometimes achieve the purpose of improving the value of the enterprise.This has aroused the investors' doubts about the equity incentive system and triggered a continuous discussion of the capital market and the academic community.The theoretical basis of the equity incentive system is the principal-agent theory.According to the principal-agent theory,under the modern corporate governance system,the company's management rights and ownership are separated.There is a serious information asymmetry between shareholders and executives.The company's executives are the real controllers of the company.In this context,the equity incentive plan may become a tool for executives to gain private benefits.If the executives have self-interest motivation to use the equity incentive plan,what is the purpose of the listed companies to implement the equity incentive plan? Does the equity incentive plan really motivate executives? How does the motivation difference in equity incentive plan affect the effectiveness of the implementation? This article hopes to clear the relationship between the equity incentive plan and the enterprise performance of the listed companies through this study.Compared with the main board listed companies,the GEM listed companies have the characteristics of high risk and imperfect corporate governance.In the implementation process of equity incentive plan of gem,what is the effect of its implementation and what problems are exposed in the middle? To solve these problems,we should standardize the behavior of Listed Companies in the process of follow-up supervision,which are worth studying.This article is divided into five parts in structure.The first part is the introduction,which mainly describes the research background and significance,research ideas and research methods,and summarizes the domestic and foreign research literature on equity incentive and motivation.The second part expounds the theoretical basis of the difference of equity incentive motivation,and makes a comparison and analysis of the existing laws and regulations that restrict equity incentive system.The third part,based on the above theoretical analysis,puts forward the hypothesis of this paper,determines the sample of the study,and establishes an analytical model to define the variables in the model.The fourth part is the empirical results and analysis.According to the results of the empirical analysis,verify whether the hypothesis is established.The fifth part summarizes the conclusions of this study,and puts forward relevant suggestions for listed companies,policy makers,regulators and investors.This paper combines theoretical analysis with empirical research,and applies management,statistics and other research methods,such as literature analysis,induction and deduction,and empirical analysis.The possible innovation points of this paper are as follows:(1)the listed companies of the gem are based on a new type and a growing enterprise.The key to the development of a growing enterprise is to stimulate the initiative of the entrepreneur's human capital in a growing enterprise.As an institutional arrangement to protect the interests of entrepreneur human capital,the equity incentive system can promote the development of entrepreneur human capital.Therefore,this paper selects the companies listed on GEM issued equity incentive plan as the research object,to understand the growth enterprise executive equity incentive effect on corporate performance;(2)the current scholars on the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance has been a lot of conclusions,but the conclusion is different.Combing the existing literature,we find that few scholars start from the motivation of equity incentive plan of listed companies to study the impact of equity incentive plan on business performance.In theory,this paper takes the motivation of equity incentive as the starting point to study the relationship between the equity incentive plan and the enterprise performance.Not only that,what are the motivations of executives' equity incentives? How to set up an index system to divide the motivation of the executive stock incentive plan? How does the equity incentive plan under different motivations affect the performance of the company? This article believes that through the in-depth exploration of these problems,we can clarify the limited problem of equity incentive plan,and better enrich the research content of equity incentive.In practice,from the perspective of enterprises,the research results of enterprise reasonable arrangements for executive compensation system,standardize the implementation of equity incentive plan,reducing agency cost,in order to promote the company's growth and provide policy recommendations;starting from the regulatory perspective,the enterprise equity incentive motivation and reasonable division,will help regulators to make laws more stringent regulations,establish investor protection mechanism;from the perspective of the market,for the study of equity incentive motivation,will help protect the interests of small investors,and promote the healthy development of China's capital market.