Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Manufacturer's R&D Activities In Supply Chain From The Perspective Of Fairness And Preference

At this stage,China's economy has entered a new normal state.Under the new normal,China's economy will shift from the driving of factor investment to the drive of innovation.In the 21 st century,innovation competition is no longer a single competition between enterprises and enterprises.It is the competition of R&D capabilities based on the supply chain.As the main body of research and development(R&D)activities in the supply chain,manufacturing companies play a more and more important role in reducing manufacturing costs and improving product competitiveness.They not only become the main driver for endogenous growth of a company,but also often show With a significant spillover effect,the benefits of its R&D activities will spill into its supply chain partners or competing firms.It is precisely due to the particularity of research and development(R&D)activities that policy makers in the supply chain have a strong preference for fairness.Individuals in decision-making are concerned about the maximum personal income,but also pay attention to whether the income distribution is fair,so the inside and outside of the supply chain As the interest community in the supply chain,it is particularly important to respond to this issue through effective incentive mechanisms.The content and results of the research conducted on the above issues include the following aspects:Firstly,through the collation of related documents,under the premise ofelaborating supply chain coordination theory,innovation theory,incentive theory,principal-agent theory,and fairness preference theory,the system sorts out supply chain R&D activities,incentive mechanisms under fair preferences,and supply chain The Research Status of Stackelberg Game in China and Abroad.Then it expounds the subject object,incentive target,and incentive method of the R&D activity incentive mechanism in the supply chain,and finds that there are potential problems in the supply chain's incentive mechanism for R&D activities of manufacturing companies under the assumption of fairness and preference,and lays a foundation for subsequent paper writing.A solid theoretical foundation.Secondly,aiming at the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of the internal and external R&D activities of manufacturing enterprises in the supply chain under the assumption of fairness preference,a two-level supply chain dominated by sellers is constructed,and the fair preference based on revenue sharing contract and cost subsidy contract is constructed.In the model,the optimal solution of each decision parameter in the Stackelberg game is solved by the inverse induction method.This paper analyzes the internal and external supply chain's incentive mechanism for manufacturer's R&D activities under the condition that only retailers have fair preference,only supplier has fair preference and both have fair preference.Conduct comparative studies.Finally,based on the results obtained from the previous article,a numerical simulation analysis was conducted to analyze the influence of fairness preferences of parties in the supply chain on the utility of both parties,and the impact of fairness preference on shared return rate,R&D efforts,and government R&D cost subsidy rate.Based on the conclusions,this paper analyzes the optimal tactical choices of internal and external incentive R&D activities in the supply chain from the perspective of fairness and preference.The research conclusions show that the existence of fair preference in the internal situation is not conducive to the enthusiasm and initiative of the revenue sharing contract to stimulate the manufacturer's R&D activities.The fairness and preference of the overweightwill lead to the decline of the overall utility of the supply chain;and when it joins the supply chain After incentivizing the main government and introducing R&D cost subsidy contracts,the level of fairness preference increased,mobilized the enthusiasm and initiative of manufacturers' R&D activities,and effectively improved the overall utility of the supply chain.The core of this paper is to use the comparative analysis and the method of Stankenberger game analysis from both internal and external perspectives of the supply chain to explore the issue of effective incentives for R&D activities in the supply chain.This paper is based on the perspective of fairness and preference.Combining the revenue-sharing contract and the cost-subsidy contract,this paper conducts in-depth research and analysis on the optimal strategy choices of the manufacturer's R&D efforts in the supply chain,contract contract design and incentive mechanism construction.The fairness preference perspective is an effective complement to the research on the incentive mechanism of supply chain R&D activities,and its fairness preference assumption is more practical in application.