Evolutionary Game Study On Supervisory Mechanism Of Recycling Of Old Industrial Building Based On System Dynamics

With the expansion of China's urban scale and the adjustment of industrial structure,a large number of abandoned or idle old industrial buildings have appeared in various provinces and cities.Recycling on the basis of renovation is an important way to deal with idle old industrial buildings,and it is also an inevitable trend.Through a survey of 104 typical old industrial building recycling projects in 19 cities in 7 regions of the country,it was found that in the construction process of the project,the developer 's construction behavior is blind and spontaneous,and the government and the public have no regulatory role.Play completely.Therefore,it is particularly important to establish a supervision mechanism for the recycling of old industrial buildings through scientific theories and methods.This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the game theory of the old industrial building recycling project supervision process,and then combines the system dynamics method to simulate the game evolution path of the participants,seek the key factors in the evolution path,and provide strategies for the participants Choose to provide a theoretical basis.The main work of this study is as follows:(1)Basic theoretical research on the supervision mechanism of old industrial building recycling.Combining field research data and literature data.It summarizes the overview of the current supervision mechanism of the recycling of old industrial buildings in China,and raises the existing problems.(2)Research on stakeholders of the old industrial building recycling regulatory mechanism.Analyzed,screened,and classified the various stakeholders involved in the old industrial building recycling regulatory mechanism,and obtained the main tripartitestakeholders as the government,developers,and the general public,and carried out interest appeals and strategic choices for the three parties The analysis analyzes the focus of the conflict of interest between the three from a qualitative perspective.(3)Research on the game model of the supervision mechanism of old industrial building recycling.Identify the government,developers and the public as the three players in the game,analyze the interests and strategies of each participant to obtain the game relationship between the three,determine the external variables of the game model design,and calculate the different players In the case of payment functions,construct a government-developer-social public evolutionary game payment matrix,establish an evolutionary game model,obtain replication dynamic equations,and analyze system equilibrium points and evolutionary stability strategies.(4)System dynamics simulation of the supervision mechanism of old industrial building recycling.According to the three-party evolutionary game model,the system dynamics model is established based on Vensim PLE software,and the system boundaries and system equations are determined according to the actual situation and logical relationship,the parameters in the model are reasonably taken,the system flow diagram is drawn,and then the model validity test.After the model is verified,carry out simulation control,change the value of the parameters in the model in turn,analyze the key factors that affect the old industrial building recycling regulatory mechanism,and give countermeasures and suggestions for each participant based on this.