Prevention Of Transfer Of Related Transaction Interests Of Listed Companies

On the one hand,due to China's special IPO system,many state-owned enterprises have been listed by splitting,and a large number of related transactions have been conducted between the new companies and the former state-owned enterprises.On the other hand,the relatively concentrated ownership structure of China's listed companies and and the information asymetry between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders make the controlling shareholders of the listed companies take advantage of the unfair related transactions and the excess control rights to carry out interest transmission,so as to seek personal gains.Due to the complexity of connected transactions and Concealment makes it harder for CPAs to audit related party transactions.This makes the controlling shareholder's non-fair related party transactions intensify.This kind of behavior of the controlling shareholder of the listed company not only exacerbates the conflict between the controlling shareholder and the small and medium shareholders,but also damages the interests of the listed company itself and the majority of investors,and affects the healthy development of China's securities market.Based on this,this article launches a precautionary study on the benefits of related-party transaction delivery of listed companies.This article takes FAW Fuwei,a controlling shareholder that has been delivering benefits through listed companies since 2003,as an example,and studies the methods,effects,and causes of related-party transaction benefit transmission to prevent the related-party transaction benefit transmission of listed companies.Through analysis,it is found that: first,the controlling shareholder mainly uses the two methods of related product purchase and sale and related fund occupation to carry out interest transmission;second: FAW Fuwei's related transaction type of interest transmission has greatly affected the listed company itself,creditors and small and medium shareholders.Three:The reasons for FAW Fuwei's related-party transaction benefit delivery are mainly: the separation of FAW Fuwei's control and cash flow rights,a dominant shareholding structure,an irrational composition of the board of directors,the failure of small and medium shareholders to play their governance role and related related transactions The legal system is imperfect.Based on the above analysis of FAW Fuwei's related-party transaction type benefit transmission,this article proposes specific measures to preventrelated-party transaction type benefit transmission,that is,to regulate the equity allocation of control rights and cash flow rights,improve the governance system of listed companies,and improve related-party transaction information disclosure.System,improve the legal supervision system,and then fundamentally regulate the controlling shareholder's connected transaction behavior to maintain the healthy development of China's securities market.