Research On Decision-making Of Electric Vehicle Battery Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Fairness Preference Of Battery Manufacturer

With the popularity of electric vehicles(EV),the recycling of EV batteries has gradually become a concerning topic and the cascade utilization of EV batteries is a hot and difficult content in the closed-loop supply chain.In addition,enterprises with fairness preference behavior not only pay attention to their own profits but also compare their own profits with other enterprises’ and then get fairness preference utility.So,the fairness preference behavior increases the difficulty and complexity of decision-making for supply chain members when making decisions.In addition,with the rapid development of big data information technology,many enterprises pay attention to the information prediction when making decisions.In this paper,we firstly consider the fairness preference behavior of battery manufacturer in electric vehicle battery closed-loop supply chain(EVB-CLSC)to analyze the influence of the fairness preference behavior on EV manufacturer and collector.We then further consider the information sharing of EV manufacturer,and design cost-sharing profit-sharing contract to coordinate the EVB-CLSC.Finally,we introduce the government to discuss the influences of cost subsidy policy on the pricing and recovery decision of EVB-CLSC members.The results show that,(i)the utility of battery manufacturer increases with the degree of fairness preference.The wholesale price,retail price,recovery rate,utility of EV manufacturer and utility of collector decrease with the increasing degree of fairness preference of battery manufacturer,and increase with the increasing green innovation technology,which is conducive to improving the utility of battery manufacturer.(ii)When the predicted market demand is greater than the market potential deterministic demand,the recovery rate,the utility of battery manufacturer,the utility of EV manufacturer and the utility of collector all increase with the increasing information accuracy.The information sharing reduces the utility of EV manufacturer,so EV manufacturer does not actively share information in the EVB-CLSC.(iii)Battery manufacturer actively implements the cost-sharing profit-sharing contract with EV manufacturer,which want to bear all the costs of green innovation,but battery manufacturer will not share all the costs of green innovation with EV manufacturer.The contract promotes the cost of investing in green innovative technology and is conducive to the recycling of batteries.EV manufacturer bears the more cost of green innovation,the more increasing the utility of collector.(iv)The cost subsidy policy is effective.Increasing government subsidies for collector is more beneficial to improve the utility of supply chain members,consumer surplus and total social utility than increasing subsidies for battery manufacturer.Cost subsidies have reduced the fairness preference of battery manufacturer.In conclusion,the green innovation increases the recovery rate.The fairness preference of battery manufacturer has increased his own utility,but has reduced the utility of EV manufacturer and collector.The information sharing reduces the utility of EV manufacturer,so he does not actively share information with other members.The cost subsidy policy of government alleviates the fairness preference degree of battery manufacturer,and more cost subsidies to collector can better improve the social utility and be more conducive to the development of EVB-CLSC than subsidies to EV manufacturer.The thesis has 26 figures,4 table and 107 references.