Incentive Effect And Improvement For Cultivated Land Protection Fund In Chengdu

The report of the 19 th National Congress pointed out that efforts should be made to create a new pattern of trinity comprehensive protection of quantity,quality,and ecology of cultivated land,and to implement the most stringent tasks for protecting farmland.The task to protect cultivated land is urgent,and cultivated land protection compensation is of great significance for establishing a long-term mechanism for farmland protection.In 2008,Chengdu took the lead in implementing the policy of economic compensation policy for farmland conservation.Taking Chengdu as research area,based on the summary of domestic and foreign literatures and guided by information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,incentive compatibility theory,and motivation crowding theory,this paper evaluated the incentive effect for cultivated land protection compensation of the exit farmers,self-sufficient farmers,part-time farmers and development farmers.Combined with the nuclear density estimation,dynamic degree model and so on,it summarized the dynamic changes of incentive effect for cultivated land protection compensation of four types of farmers,used the bivariate thai index and dominance model to analyze the spatial heterogeneity of four types of farmer’s incentive effects for cultivated land protection fund,and proposed specific improvement measures.The conclusions were as follows:First,in terms of dynamic change characteristics,the incentive effects for cultivated land protection compensation of self-sufficient farmers and development farmers have changed significantly,while the incentive effects for cultivated land protection compensation of exit farmers and part-time farmers changed weakly.Exit-type farmers only showed a significant upward trend in non-agricultural production;Self-sufficient farmers showed a downward trend in farmland protection and agricultural production,and showed an upward trend in non-agricultural production;Development farmers showed a downward trend in farmland protection and agricultural production;The changes in the three incentive effects of the part-time farmers are not significant.Secondly,in terms of spatial heterogeneity,the incentive effects for cultivated land protection compensation of various types of farmers in suburbs and outer suburbs were significantly different.Overall,the spatial heterogeneity of incentive effects for cultivated land protection compensation of four types of farmers in suburbs and outer suburbs was the most significant,and it was the weakest between suburbs and outer suburbs.The spatial heterogeneity of farmland protection performance and agricultural production performance showed that the internal differences of farmers gradually converged,the differences betweensuburbs and outer suburbs gradually expanded,and the differences between farmers showed a fluctuating trend;The spatial heterogeneity of non-agricultural production performance showed that the spatial heterogeneity between farmers gradually converged,the difference in farmers and the difference between the suburbs and outer suburbs showed a fluctuating trend.From the perspective of the differences in performance among farmers,no matter what kind of incentive effect,the internal differences of exit farmers,self-sufficient farmers and part-time farmers in suburbs were greater than those in outer suburbs,while the internal differences of development farmers in two areas were close;From the difference in performance between farmers,the spatial differences between farmers in the suburbs were greater than that in outer suburbs.Based on the spatial difference of the incentive effect for cultivated land protection fund,it was found that the exit farmer’s non-agricultural production advantage was outstanding both in suburban and outer suburbs,the self-sufficient farmer’s farmland protection advantage was outstanding,and the development farmer’s farmland protection and agricultural production had outstanding advantages.The part-time farmers had non-agricultural production advantage in surburbs,and farmland protection and agricultural production advantages in outer surburbs.Thirdly,combined with the obstacle degree model to analyze the obstacle factors of the incentive effect for cultivated land protection fund,the barrier factors of the incentive effects for cultivated land protection compensation for the farmers in suburbs are diversified,and that were relatively single for farmers in outer suburbs which paying more attention to compensation fairness.The improvement path for farmland protection included the development of the “big park with small business owner” business model,expansion of compensation methods and introduction of market competition,etc;The improvement path of agricultural production included revitalizing funding sources,setting compensation standards based on crop types,etc;The improvement path of non-agricultural production included guiding land out,establishing land transfer information platform and land bank,etc.