Farmers’ Protection In Land Protection Willingness Behavior Selection And Incentive Mechanism

China has a large population base. Population growth is increasing the demand for agricultural products, to guarantee enough land for agricultural production, however, along with the city and the accelerated development of industrialization, pollution and waste a large amount of cultivated land occupation of cultivated land, serious damage to the face of this grim situation, the urgent need to strengthen the protection of arable land. How to protect the limited cultivated land resource in the economic development and at the same time, different scholars have put forward the suggestion and countermeasure from different angles. However, farmers as direct user of cultivated land, play a key role in the protection of cultivated land. In-depth study of the farmers land protection willingness and behavior is of great practical significance to study on the protection of arable land resources choice problem.China is currently in a period of rapid development of city, urban and rural construction land scale is continually expanding, taking up a large amount of agricultural land, especially the cultivated land, speed up the cultivated land area decrease trend. At the same time, the quality of cultivated land degradation, the national food security is facing a serious threat. The low comparative benefit of cultivated land, lack of labor, land property right is not clear, the cultivated land protection willingness of farmers is low, ignore the positive externalities cause the unreasonable use of land. In this paper, combined with the farmer behavior theory, theory of sustainable utilization of cultivated land, public goods and externality of cultivated land protection theory, institutional demand and supply theory of farmers’participation in cultivated land protection activities. In this paper, through the analysis of cultivated land behavior logic that:the cultivated land protection behavior has a natural tendency to deviate from the social optimum state. Therefore we need to protect arable land, must according to the selective incentive mechanism of farmers cost-benefit function to design effective. At the same time to ensure the protection of arable land of farmers in decision-making in line with the social optimal goals. Evolutionary game analysis from the perspective of farmers’participation in land protection based on the learned:to make farmers to participate in the protection of arable land, requires the government to ensure the protection of arable land revenue of farmers to access. If you do not participate in the protection of cultivated land earnings than in cultivated land protection, then no one is willing to participate in the protection of arable land or someone to non-agricultural industries, and the choice of migrant workers. So the government should take the incentive mechanism to ensure the protection of farmers’ participation in land revenue. The system is an effective method to implement the protection of cultivated land. China has established a series of the world’s most stringent farmland protection system since1986, mobilize the farmers to participate in the protection of arable land, motivating farmers to participate in the protection of arable land enthusiasm and constrained farmers land destroying impulse, which in different land system of more or less reflected, thus become the main form to guide farmers to participate in the protection of cultivated land.This paper is divided into five parts. The first part introduces the theoretical foundation for research, including the economic behavior of peasant household land theory, multifunctional and sustainable use of cultivated land, cultivated land external benefit and external protection, institutional demand and supply theory. For the second part, discuss farmers involved in the situation of cultivated land protection of cultivated land protection from the background, three main forms of farmers in the protection of arable land and the status and role and farmers to participate in the protection of cultivated land. At the same time, in-depth analysis of farmers’ participation in land protection problems. The third part is a based on the evolutionary game theory from the perspective of the farmers involved in land protection analysis framework, first analysis of basic logic in the cultivated land protection behavior analysis of farmers’ Introducing evolutionary game model of farmers involved in land protection. In the fourth part of the Jiangxi of Xinjian County province for example, analysis of the farmers involved in land protection on empirical, Descriptive statistics analysis of the farmers’cognition and intention in land protection,involved in land protection Logistic model of farmers’ willingness to pay for the cultivated land protection. Through the analysis of factors that include the Xinjian County area has a significant impact on Farmers’ participation in land protection:the farmer’s age, educational level, family type of agriculture, agricultural labor force, agricultural income, the total area of arable land, cultivated land, cultivated land protection blocks area job satisfaction degree. Farmers’ age, participation in land protection will get stronger; farmers engaged in farming activities habit is stronger, participation in the protection of arable land will correspondingly stronger; agricultural labor population more willingness to participate in family, cultivated land protection is high; agricultural income more, more willing to participate in the protection of cultivated land; Peasant arable land the total area is larger and the number of farmers farming plots, the less willing to participate in the protection of cultivated land. At the same time, analysis the farmers involved in land protection behavior selection and policy effect.Finally put forward relevant incentive mechanism of cultivated land protection, including:intensify propaganda, strengthen peasant arable land protection consciousness, improve farmland protection system of laws and regulations, improve the efficiency of land, construction of long-term stability of the farmland property right system, establish a fund system of cultivated land protection, the establishment of various subsidies, support and preferential policies, establishing and perfecting the rural social service system.