| China is a big fishery country with the highest output of aquatic products in the world.Capture fisheries are an important part of Chinese fisheries.China has a vast sea area and numerous lakes.The lake capture fishery has a long history.It occupies a small proportion of China's capture fisheries,but it is still an important part of capture fisheries.Taihu Lake is one of the five largest freshwater lakes in China.It has rich fishery resources and a long history of fishing.However,it is also facing the problem of overfishing,environmental pollution and deterioration of water quality.At present,China adopts a fishery resource management system based on input control.The closed fishing season and the no-fishing zone system,the fishing permit system,and the nature reserve system cannot fundamentally solve the problems faced by Taihu fishery development.The output control management system based on the fishing quota system is a fishery resource management system currently adopted by many fishery developed countries and international organizations.The ITQ system and the CQ system are the two main forms of implementation of the quota system.By analyzing the research status of the quota system it is found that most scholars qualitatively analyze the feasibility of the system in China from the perspectives of system design,law and property rights because China has not fully implemented the quota system.Most foreign scholars quantitatively analyze the economic efficiency of the quota system and the problems in the implementation process according to the implementation of different countries.In contrast,China's research on the quota system still has a gap with foreign scholars.Taihu Lake is an early development area for capture fisheries.Fishing is an important source of income for fish farmers in Taihu Lake.The rational use of fishery resources is a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the income of fishermen and improving local economic benefits.The decline of fishery resources,the reduction of biodiversity and the trend towards miniaturization and simplification of fish species have hindered the development of fisheries in Taihu Lake.The fishermen are mainly professional fishermen living in the in Taihu Lake area.They are generally high in age and generally biased in education.The main methods of operation of fishermen aredragging,tying,stabbing,applying,fishing and hoeing.The main catches are salmon silverfish and so on.The annual output of Taihu Lake capture fisheries maintained a low growth rate and the annual output value maintained a certain rate.However,the total catch production far exceeds the maximum sustainable yield of Taihu Lake estimated by scholars.Taihu Lake is an early lake that implements a closed fishing and no-fishing zone system,the fishing permit system and the nature reserve system.Existing fisheries management methods constitute a complete management system in Taihu Lake.This study conducted field research on the professional fishing village in Taihu.At the same time,the study analyze the actual situation of fishery production in Taihu Lake according to the questionnaire.The production status of trawl fisheries was studied by means of production cost and economic benefit analysis and sensitivity analysis with taking trawlers as an example in Taihu.The study found that there are three problems in the trawl fishery in Taihu Lake:(1)the actual fishing time of the fishing boat is too long and the closed fishing period system has not achieved the best effect;(2)The economic benefit of unit power decreases with the increase of the power of the trawl boat and the fishing vessel has excessive investment problems;(3)The cost of ice and fuel costs is the primary cost item affecting the profitability of trawlers.However,the current fuel subsidy policy is inclined to high-power trawl vessels stimulating fishermen to invest in fishing vessels.This also has led to increased fishing intensity and increased pressure on the use of fishery resources.It can be seen that the sustainable development of trawl fisheries faces many threats under the fishery management system in Taihu Lake.It is necessary to study the feasibility of implementing the output control management system in Taihu Lake.This study uses a static game model to analyze the feasibility of the quota system in Taihu.The two-party game model between fishermen and the government is used to analyze the feasibility of implementing the IQ system in Taihu Lake.The study found that the government's regulatory costs,government supervision and penalties for fishermen's illegal fishing are the three main factors affecting fishermen's participation in the IQ system.From the perspective of fishermen reducing government supervision costs,improving government supervision and increasing the punishment of fishermen's illegal fishing can encourage fishermen to actively participate in the IQ system.In reality,the IQ system is directly regulated by the government which seems to reduce the intermediate links.However,the government's regulatory costs are large and difficult toreduce.From the perspective of the government,high penalties and high supervision have led the government to lax supervision and passively participate in the IQ system.In reality,it is inevitable that the government will set a high fine in order to save costs which will lead to lax supervision of fishermen.Therefore,the feasibility of implementing the IQ system is relatively low in Taihu Lake.The study uses the model of fishermen,government and community tripartite games to analyse the feasibility of implementing the CQ system in Taihu Lake.The feasibility of implementing the CQ system in Taihu Lake was analyzed using a model of fishermen,government and community tripartite games.The research results show that the enthusiasm of fishermen to participate in the CQ system is affected by the following five factors:(1)government and community supervision costs;(2)The punishment of fishermen for illegal fishing;(3)The proceeds of illegal fishing by fishermen;(4)Losses caused by illegal fishing by fishermen to the government and the community;(5)Supervision by the government and the community.The enthusiasm of the government and the community to participate in the CQ system is affected by the punishment of illegal fishing by fishermen and the supervision of the government and the community.If the government and community action are consistent it will weaken the impact of illegal punishment on the enthusiasm of the government and the community to participate in the CQ system.The final study concluded that the feasibility of implementing the CQ system is greater in Taihu Lake.The existing "social capital" has greatly reduced the cost of community regulation in Taihu Lake.At the same time,it encourages fishermen to actively participate in the CQ system and also reduces the government's regulatory costs.If the government and community actions are consistent it will weaken the influence of the fishermen's illegal punishment on the enthusiasm of the government and the community to participate in the CQ system.This avoids the government's slack supervision by setting high fines to save on regulatory costs.Countermeasures and suggestions(1)reduce government and community supervision costs,improve the efficiency of CQ system implementation;(2)improve government and community supervision,reduce the punishment of fishermen's illegal fishing;(3)increase investment in environmental protection and resource conservation,establish a punishment mechanism for the community. |
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