Influences Of Punishment Rules On Group Cooperation From The Perspective Of Efficiency And Fairness

Since the beginning of human society,group cooperation has been a major problem affecting human development.Individuals pursuing their own maximization of benefits often undermine social collective benefits,therefore group cooperation will not necessarily occur.As a result,social systems and social norms emerges to constrain individuals' self-interested behavior and to maintain social order.This raises the question of how cooperation emerged and evolved among unrelated individuals.A deeper understanding of the mechanisms behind group cooperation may help design more rational social systems.Game theory provides a powerful theoretical framework for the study of the cooperative relationships between individuals.At present,there are mainly six mechanisms has been proposed for promoting cooperation in the research field of the evolution of cooperation.Among them,the punishment mechanism is favored because it is similar to the social law enforcement system.The punishment cost is often the premise of punishment implementation.However,the recognition of the institutional punishment mechanism to promote cooperation remains to be further deepened and expanded.Based on this,we investigates the priority and symbiosis of the different types of institutional punishment rules under different constraints from the perspective of fairness and efficiency.Institutional selection is influenced by subjective preferences including no preference(standing for fairness),cost preference(standing for efficiency)and emotional preference(standing for unfairness)and objective constraint containing information of defector and the limitation of punishment resources.The research established a social punishment system that includes a punitive institution and multiple individuals to explore social cooperation and resources accumulation of institution under different rules using mathematical modeling and computer simulation experimental methods.Results show that the difference between three types of punishment rules is not significant(symbiosis)and it mainly depends on whether the punishment resources are sustainable under all defectors will be punished conditions.However,under partial punishment conditions,the differences between the three rules are very significant(priority)and the fair punishment(random punishment rule)have significant advantages.efficiency punishment(cost preference rule)have priority when the punishment is tolerance and punishment rate is low in a society with a low degree of social cooperation and difficult access to information.In addition,we found the area of promoting cooperation and increasing resource accumulation is not always consistent,reflecting the conflict between economic benefits and social cooperation.This is mainly due to the inconsistent effect of the punishment degree and punishment rate on cooperation and resource accumulation.in detailed,the impact of the punishment degree on resources accumulation is uncertain,while it promotes cooperation if it exceeds the critical value.When the punishment rate exceeds a certain threshold,the greater the punishment rate is,the lower the accumulation of funds,while the more the cooperation is promoted.The implications of simulation conclusion for public management lie in choosing different penalty rules and adjusting corresponding parameters for different social states.for example,managers can improve social cooperation by increase punishment degree and punishment rate in a low degree of cooperation and difficult access to information society.they can increase resources accumulation by choosing fair punishment and the medium punishment rates.