Research On The Governmental Supervisions And Regulations On Online Ride-hailing Services From The Perspective Of Evolutionary Game

The online ride-hailing service,which is one of the creatures of "Internet+traditional industry" model with the development of science and technology in recent years,has brought many conveniences to our daily life,but also many problems.Since 2016,Chinese government has taken actions to fill the supervision of 'vacuum',however,governmental regulation of the industry is not in place that accidents still happen frequently till now.It has become a key issue to the government to strengthen regulatory measures and standardize the regulatory system.The thesis defines the concepts of online ride-hailing service and government regulation and introduces the theory of "Public Choice" and "Evolutionary Game" in the first part.The status of the supervision of the online ride-hailing industry in China on the development stage,the current supervision mode and issues is also discussed.The inter interest game between the platform companies and drivers and the intra-game of the platform company are two important reasons for the supervision problem of the online ride-hailing industry.Although the administrative department does not directly participate in,it can influence the behavioral choices and behavioral outcomes of participants through regulation and supervision.Two sets of Evolutionary Game model are built on the basis of theoretical and reality analysis.The first one is about the inter evolutionary game between the platform companies and their drivers.According to the assessment of the stable evolution strategy of the online ride-hailing platform companies,the drivers and the whole game system,factors such as the recognition cost of these platform,the compliance cost the drivers,and the penalties cost and supervision efficiency of government fundamentally affect the evolution direction of the platform companies and drivers.The second model is the intra-game of the platform companies themselves.Differently,the compliance identification costs,the additional benefits from non-compliance,the penalties for breaching the regulations,and the governmental regulatory efficiency are the key factors that influence the group evolution of the companies.In the end,conclusions obtained in the previous analysis will be integrated that countermeasures were proposed from the perspective of the government in three stages:before,during and after the events.Before the events,access restrictions need to be clear and improved that the compliance costs of the platform drivers can be reduced.Multi-sectoral joint reviews can reduce identification costs of platform companies.The administrative and judicial supervision need to be strengthen that the punishment costs of platform companies for violations are increased.Also,the efficiency of supervision of government administration departments can be improved through administrative supervisions.During the events,it is necessary to clarify the rules and punishments that cost of breaking the laws are increased and aware.At last,there need to be a complaint-freezing mechanism that connect the civil liability and criminal liability to increase the punishment cost of the companies and drivers.