Power,Partisanship And Loyalty

Since taking office in 2017,US President Donald Trump has launched a series of trade protectionist policies,such as starting a trade war with China and imposing high tariffs on America’s allies in Europe and North America.Under the American constitutional system of separation of powers,the US Constitution clearly gives Congress the power to regulate international commerce.Since Congress enjoys regulatory authority over trade issues and supervises US foreign trade policy in general,why did President Trump become the initiator of the trade war as well as the decision-maker to impose tariffs on foreign nations?On the other hand,the Republican Party controlled both Houses of the 115th Congress(201 7-2018)in the early days of Trump’s administration,and Trump’s trade protectionism actually runs counter to the Republican Party’s long-standing advocacy of free trade.Why,then,didn’t Congress and the Republican lawmakers in particular rein in Trump’s manipulation of US trade policies,especially given his anti-establishment,convention-shattering style?This paper seeks to explain Congress’s non-interference with Trump’s trade polices from three perspectives,namely,Congressional delegation of trade powers to the president,historical changes of the two major parties’ trade inclinations,and party loyalty in an age of heightened polarization.First of all,Congress has been shifting trade regulation powers to the executive branch for years,which provides the legal basis for Trump’s trade protectionist policies.Congressional delegation of trade powers to the president can be traced back to the 1930s,and such delegation,like the Trae Act of 1974 which confers the fast track authority to the President,has empowered the President to take unilateral action on trade issues under certain conditions.Second,while Congress still retains the authority to invalidate the president’s trade policies through legislation,the current bipartisan consensus against free trade has largely precluded Congress from taking legal action to restrain Trump’s policies.A historical survey shows that since the 1970s,the Democratic Party has gradually shifted its position on trade to the opposition of free trade,while the Republican party has become more in favor of free trade.However,since Trump’s campaign in the 2016 election,the Republicans seemed to have shifted their stance on trade to the opposition of free trade,much like their Democratic counterparts.Such changes have given Trump bipartisan support in Congress on his trade protectionist policies.Lastly,this paper further explores the reasons behind Congressional non-interference with Trump’s trade policy,and finds that it has much to do with party loyalty within the context of polarization.While some Republicans have indeed switched their positions on trade and shown support for Trump’s trade protectionism,most Republicans support Trump because of party loyalty.Because of Trump’s popularity among Republican voters,Republican Congress members are reluctant to call out Trump’s protectionism in fear of losing seats in Congressional elections.In addition,because voter interests in their constituencies are not severely affected by trade protectionism,some Republican Congress members also refrain from challenging the president from within the party.Trump’s trade protectionist policies have indeed caused widespread concerns and worries around the world.This paper attempts to analyze the US Congress’response to the president’s trade protectionist policies and explain why Congress,especially the Republican Party,did not rein in the president over trade issues.So far little research has been done directly on this subject,therefore this paper fills a research gap while also reveals the profound changes in the Republican Party in recent years.In other words,this paper sheds light on the current ecological changes in America’s domestic politics both in theory and practice.