Transatlantic Convergence And Divergence:European And American Policies On Iran's Nuclear Program

The revelation of Iran secret nuclear program in 2003 attracted great intentional attention.Non-proliferation was one of the significant issues of global security governance,which was closely related to regional peace and stability.Iran's Nuclear Program posed a threat to the stability,peace process,religious harmony as well as the improvement of human right in the Middle East.Had Iran gained nuclear weapon,nuclear cascade or further proliferation could happen in the Middle East.To solve Iranian nuclear conundrum,the strength of one single country would not be adequate and international cooperation was necessary.The US and the EU were two of the most important actors in resolving the Iran nuclear problem.The US and the EU enjoyed cultural and ideological affinity and shared similar interests.Since WWII,the unique transatlantic alliance was formed due to the deep cooperation between these two actors in a variety of fields.But in the face of current global affairs,the EU and the US rarely formed the same front line.The reasons behind it resided not only in different interests but also in the different approaches to global governance.This thesis is intended to explore the implications of the convergent and divergent transatlantic policies on Iran's Nuclear Program through historical analysis and literature review.The EU and the US shared similar but not identical interests in the Middle East.Transatlantic policies on Iran's Nuclear Program had been through the process from divergence to convergence and from convergence to divergence again,during which different exogenous and endogenous factors in all parties affected the policy-making outcome,including international system,domestic politics in Iran,the EU and the US,and their diplomatic relations et cetera.Based on policy documents of the EU and the US,news reports,remarks of leaders and officials,documents and reports of international institutions such as the UN and the IAEA,as well as the policy analysis of main think tanks such as Istituto Affari Internazionali,this thesis analyzes the transatlantic policies on Iran's Nuclear Program.The thesis summarizes the main factors behind different policies of the EU and the US:the historical dynamic of transatlantic relations,distinctive modes of global governance,perceptions of threat,and disparate interests.This thesis argues that distinctive modes of global governance and disparate interests contribute to transatlantic divergence on Iran's nuclear program.Upholding "utilitarian multilateralism",America has been long oscillating between multilateral cooperation and unilateral operation throughout the process of Iran's Nuclear Program.In practice,the primacy of American interest has been the consistent norm when the US was in the face of international crisis,which was guaranteed by American supremacy in economic,political and military strength or its unparalleled hard power.In contrast,the EU,as a representative of "civilian" or "normative power",promoted the norm of "effective multilateralism" as a complement to its foreign policy,calling for the multilateral and diplomatic approach on the basis of multilateral institutions such as the UN to resolve international crises.The interplay of these factors and different understandings of interests were projected in the divergent policy outcome of the EU and the US.Iran nuclear conundrum was not a new challenge of the 21st century.The convergence and divergence of the transatlantic policies could be traced back to the historical interaction between transatlantic countries with Iran.Iran's Nuclear Program originated in the 1950s since Iran started to accept the technical assistance of the civilian nuclear program from western countries led by the US.Western assistance sowed the seeds of the international conundrum of Iran's Nuclear Program.Since the 1970s,Iran's Nuclear Program expanded at an exponential rate,which caused the concerns over proliferation in western countries immediately.Marking a watershed in Iran's Nuclear Program and its relations with transatlantic countries,the breakout of The Islamic Revolution caused the antagonism that lasted for more than three decades between Iran and western countries.Despite the enduring hostility between Iran and the US,European countries maintained relatively amicable diplomatic relations with Iran due to the close cooperation in economy and trade and relatively less geopolitical confrontation.Since then,divergence emerged in transatlantic policies on Iran and its nuclear program.The US formed its conventional policy on Iran-isolation and containment.But main European countries acknowledged the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.Since the 1990s,the EU started to ameliorate the tensions with Iran through active engagement,promoting dialogue and diplomacy and trying to use economic incentives to integrate Iran back to the international community.The negotiations on Iran's nuclear program since 2003 will be divided into three phases in this thesis according to the leading party in the negotiations-the first phase was led by the E3 countries,the second phase was under the framework of the UN and P5+1 format,and the third phase was led by the US.In the first phase,the US adopted passive isolation and containment and was absent in all the negotiations,whereas the E3 countries and the EU followed its conventional strategy of diplomacy and dialogue and actively engaged in the negotiations.Listing Iran as "Axis of Evil",the US was intended to reach the goal of regime change in Iran through exerting pressure on the international community with no inclination to enter the multilateral negotiations,because national security and counter-terrorism were paramount in American perception of threat after 911.The Iranian connection with terrorist group exacerbated the hostility between the US and Iran.In contrast to American unilateral approach,the EU filled the vacancy of the US and led the negotiations with Iran,putting "effective multilateralism" in practice and offering incentives to Iran in exchange for enrichment suspension and commitment to Additional Protocol.Except maintaining the peace and security of the Middle East,the intention of the E3 and the EU behind the engagement was to preserve their influence and protect their economic interest in the Middle East.In the second phase,transatlantic politics started to converge.The EU gradually hardened its stance,resorting to punitive measures,and the US gradually adopted a conciliatory tone,turning to diplomacy and dialogue.Both the EU and the US started to implement "double track" strategy or "carrot and stick" strategy.Although transatlantic cooperation culminated when Obama became American president,the intentions of the EU and the US differed behind the similar strategy.Advocating multilateral approaches to solving international crises,Obama sought to assuage diplomatic relations with Iran.But these conciliatory gestures were adopted to consolidate American leadership in the world and to justify its punitive measures,using stricter sanctions to damage Iran's economy so as to achieve its implicit goal of changing Iranian government.The European Union shifted to accept more restrictive measures on Iran,which was mainly due to the deterioration of the EU-Iran relations caused by growing Iranian nationalism and intransigence,the prevention of potential conflict escalation between Iran and Israel that would harm European interests in the Middle East,as well as the exacerbation of refugee crisis in Europe.The pressure of the US was not a sufficient factor behind the shifting stance of the European countries on punitive measures.In the third phase,secret bilateral talks between the US and Iran existed in parallel with multilateral negotiations under P5+1 format which were mitigated and facilitated by the EU.In spite of no practical authority,exploiting its strength of soft power,the EU became the perfect "neutral broker" in the negotiations and played an irreplaceable role as the"coordinator" and "mediator".Throughout the negotiations of Iran's Nuclear Program,in general,the EU committed to multilateral approach in the consideration of its own interests and its international role as a "normative" or "civilian" power.After the election of Trump,Transatlantic policies diverged again.Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA attested American oscillations between "multilateralism" and "unilateralism",and the hidden guidance of primacy of national interests and "utilitarian multilateralism”in American policy-making process.In addition,the efficacy of "effective multilateralism" in tackling the international crisis was challenged,since the fate of JCPOA was unclear.The EU demonstrated its commitment to the deal and responded to the double pressure from the US and Iran,seeking for diplomatic resolutions to preserve JCPOA through presiding multilateral negotiations in the Joint Commission,so as to protect the achievement of its coherent foreign policy.In conclusion,in the transatlantic relations,even though the EU and the US were alliance and shared similar interests,the unilateral policies of the US standing out from time to time would influence the vital interests of the EU in the Middle East,which would urge the EU to compete with the US and seek more autonomy and independence in its foreign policies,even though the EU was still highly dependent on the US with regard to security issues.Whether the EU could play a leading role in the international security governance still hinged on whether it could break through the constraints caused by its dependence on the US,promote multilateralism and protect its own interest.