The Influence Of The Leadership Of The State-owned Enterprise Party On The Incentives Of Managers

Since the reform and opening up,China's state-owned enterprises have made significant contributions to the national economy and the people's livelihood.Due to the existence of the phenomenon of “owner absence” in state-owned enterprises,party organizations participate in corporate governance and play a supervisory and regulatory role in the behavior of state-owned enterprises.The leadership strength of the party in state-owned enterprises is essentially an incomplete contract between the party organization and the managers of state-owned enterprises.The study of the party's leadership intensity needs to be analyzed from the decision-making mechanism of both parties.The factors to be considered include decision-making reference points.And other psychological factors,this is beyond the scope of the classic complete contract theory.In view of this,this paper attempts to study the relationship between the leadership strength of state-owned enterprise party and the efforts of state-owned enterprise managers from the perspective of contractual reference point based on the paradigm of behavioral economics and incomplete contract theory.Based on the contract reference point theory,this paper explores the interaction between the party's leadership intensity and the efforts of state-owned enterprise managers,and discusses the inefficiencies and solutions that may be caused by the party's leadership intensity policy under different conditions.From the perspective of internal reference points,the root cause of inefficiency comes from the deviation of the expectations of party organizations and state-owned enterprise managers on the party's leadership intensity.If the party organization can announce the party's leadership intensity plan in advance,it should be able to effectively unify.Both parties expect to improve business efficiency.From the perspective of external reference points,the reason for the inefficiency comes from the fact that the leadership strength of the relevant party outside the enterprise has adjusted the original decision-making reference points of the party organizations and state-owned enterprise managers of the enterprise,and thus to achieve high efficiency of enterprises,the superior party When planning the leadership strength of the state-owned enterprise party,the organization should fully consider the external environment in which the enterprise is located,and avoid the large difference between the preset strength and the reference enterprise.The empirical part of this paper uses the simultaneous equation model and uses the data of state-owned listed companies from 2009 to 2014 for relevant empirical analysis.The empirical results show that:(1)there is a mutually inhibiting relationship between the party's leadership intensity and the efforts of state-owned enterprise managers.Optimizing the party's leadership strength within a reasonable range is conducive to the state-owned enterprises to improve operational efficiency;(2)the past party of the enterprise Leadership intensity level and industry average party leadership intensity have significant reference point effects on state-owned enterprise managers.The higher-level party organizations should fully consider the influence of the reference point effect when planning party leadership strength.Finally,based on theoretical research and empirical analysis,this paper puts forward the expected effective policy recommendations: presuppose the leadership intensity of the state-owned enterprise party leadership;adjust the preset strength with reference to the industry situation;maintain policy stability;fully consider the acceptance of state-owned enterprise managers.