Research On Target Deviation And Correction Of Local Government Performance Appraisal From The Perspective Of Principal-agent Theory

Government performance appraisal is an important governance tool to promote the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity.In the process of deepening the reform in an all-round way,the performance appraisal of local government plays an important role in improving the governance efficiency of the government,accelerating the transformation of government functions,and promoting the construction of responsible and service-oriented government.In China,local government performance appraisal has made steady progress in continuous exploration and change,and has made some obvious achievements,which has accumulated valuable experience for the further implementation of government performance appraisal.However,at present,there is no unified government performance appraisal mode in China,and local governments are still independent in performance appraisal.In the specific practice process,performance appraisal objectives often deviate from expectations,resulting in local government performance appraisal unable to play its due functions,formal tendency,and even negative effects,seriously endangering the effective governance of local governments And rapid development.Therefore,it is necessary to improve the local government performance appraisal system,strengthen the management and control of performance appraisal objectives,and further promote the local government performance appraisal system to be scientific,standardized and institutionalized.From the perspective of principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship formed between different levels of governments in the performance appraisal of local governments and the principal-agent problems generated in the interactive game process.With the help of the specific process of performance appraisal of emission reduction work during the 13 th five year plan of Shanxi Province,it explains the performance and harm of the deviation of performance appraisal objectives of local governments,explores and analyzes its occurrence The specific causes of formation,and put forward the corresponding corrective measures.First of all,based on the elaboration of the principal-agent theory and the definition of the related concepts of local government performance appraisal,this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship in the local government performance appraisal,and emphasizes that a long and complex principal-agent chain is formed from the top to the bottom in the process of government performance appraisal under the pressure system of our country,and there isa multi-level principal-agent structure in the chain.Then from the perspective of the superior government,the subordinate government and the evaluation department,this paper expounds the phenomenon of target deviation in the performance evaluation of local governments,including the performance forms of target addition,target selection,target substitution,etc.,which results in the distortion of performance evaluation results,the transformation of performance evaluation function,and the formality of performance evaluation,resulting in the performance evaluation of local governments Nuclear energy is not effective.Then,the paper analyzes the causes of the deviation of the government performance appraisal target from the aspects of the principal-agent structure of the local government performance appraisal,the local government performance appraisal ecology and the local government performance appraisal incentive and restraint mechanism.Finally,according to the specific performance and cause analysis of local government performance appraisal target deviation,this paper puts forward the corrective measures to optimize the principal-agent structure of local government performance appraisal,improve the local government performance appraisal ecology,and improve the incentive and restraint mechanism of local government performance appraisal.