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Capture Elites Or Elite Capture?

Posted on:2020-05-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y HeFull Text:PDF
GTID:2417330575994776Subject:Sociology
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the fight against poverty and the entry into the final stage,the task of driving more than 30 million poverty-stricken people out of poverty through the industry during the 13th Five-Year Plan period began to enter the "countdown".The difficulty in implementing the poverty alleviation policy at the grassroots level lies in the question of"who will develop the resources for poverty alleviation projects".The solution of this problem will directly affect the effect of poverty alleviation practice in industrial development.From the results of project resource allocation,this paper allocates the industrial poverty alleviation resources to the "captured" elites in the non-poverty villages,which are called villages in the villages.The distribution to the non-poor households in the villages is called the individual dimension.The elite "captured." Most of the previous empirical research focused on the latter,and it tends to regard elite capture as the“active capture”of elites in the process of industrial poverty alleviation and resource allocation.Starting from the system,power and social structure,this perspective presupposes the elite's action logic as the interest setting for pursuing the benefits of industrial projects.Most of these studies use the interpretation framework of the state-society/elite-people dual opposition.They examine the static dimension and think that the elites are easy to form power collusion in the face of resources going to the countryside to actively capture projects for poor households.Resources.This perspective sees the interest game of social forces behind elite capture,but lacks analysis and interpretation of social processes related to this in specific situations.In the context of poverty governance,this paper constructs an organizational capacity-analytical framework for elite capture,and focuses on the action/structural relationship in the allocation of government resources for industr:ial poverty alleviation through a field perspective.The focus is on how the organizational capabilities of different beneficiaries influence the final distribution of industrial poverty alleviation resources in response to a basic question:how can“capture”elites and elites“capture”in the industrial poverty alleviation field?The study found that the resource allocation of inter-village industrial projects is essentially the result of the selective distribution of township government power,and the project allocation within the village is the result of the interaction between the farmers and the elite after the organization.The former follows the top-down administrative control logic,while the latter manifests itself in the rural practice logic of the village society from the bottom up.Specifically,the mechanism of the "capture" elite of the village is;under the constraints of sports governance and fund management,the fund allocation mechanism for ex post subsidies makes the industrial project have the convenience of management and the preference of the fund scale,giving the elite Capture provides the institutional basis.At the same time,the authoritative division of village-level organizations and the clan conflicts of clan organizations have led to delays in the industrial projects of poor villages,and provided an organizational basis for the wealthy villages where the township government chose to be stronger.The mechanism for the "capture" of individual elites was:Economic and social differentiation and rural public dissolving lead to the "absence" of poverty alleviation subjects.Individualized small farmers can not meet the contractual relationship foundation that must be relied upon to undertake projects when poverty alleviation projects arrive at villages.At the same time,under the hierarchical management logic of industrial projects,the self-interest of elites promotes the formation of organized interest alliances to actively capture industrial project resources.This kind of peasant "de-organization" and elite self-interest provide a social foundation for the"capture" of industrial projects within the village.
Keywords/Search Tags:Capture Elites, Elite Capture, Industrial poverty alleviation, Resource allocation, Organizational capacity
PDF Full Text Request
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