Research On Profit Optimization Of The Straw Power Generation Supply Chain Under The Government Subsidies Considering Fairness Preference

In recent years,with the rapid development of economies around the world,energy shortages and environmental problems caused by fossil fuels have also emerged.Countries are beginning to look for renewable clean energy.The biomass power generation industry represented by straw has attracted attention and has been widely used.Under the government's strong advocacy and support,China's straw power generation project has been rapidly promoted.However,straw power generation projects in most regions are in a state of micro profit or even losses.According to actual national conditions,the supply of straw raw materials is subject to farmers and intermediaries,and the intensity and distribution of government subsidies and fairness preference affect enthusiasm of farmers and brokers.Therefore,this thesis intends to consider the influence of fairness preference in the context of government subsidies and explore the issue of profit optimization of straw power generation supply chain.Based on the cooperation relationship among the members in the straw power generation supply chain,this thesis first establishes the profit model of the supply chain under government subsidies,quantifies the supply of straw and purchase price strategies,and compares and analyzes the decisions of the members without subsidies and government subsidies,proving the necessity and importance of government subsidies.Then,the behavioral factors of fairness preference is introduced.Through modelling,each member's decision-making and profit change is analyzed when farmers have fairness preference and brokers have fairness preference behavior,the different influence of the two preference on the operation of the supply chain is compared and numerical simulation of the theoretical part is made by MATLAB.Further,under the condition of limited government subsidies,and simultaneously considering the influence of fairness preference,this thesis establishes profit optimization model under the circumstances,combined with the analysis of examples,discusses how the government allocates subsidies to farmers and brokers to maximize the profits of the supply chain,and verifies the different influence of the different members' fair preference intensity on the distribution of government subsidies.Finally,several reasonable application strategies are proposed.This research shows: under the government subsidies,the amount of raw materials in the straw power generation supply chain is increased,and the profit of all members and the whole is improved;the straw supply of farmers,the price of brokers and power plants are related to fairness preference of farmers and brokers,and fair preference behavior can increase their own utility and decrease others' utility.The utility of the whole supply chain also shows an increasing trend.However,the decrease in the amount of raw materials is not conducive to the long-term stable operation of the supply chain.The effect of the government's subsidies on farmers and brokers is influenced by fairness preference.Under different preference situations and strengths,there is a subsidy distribution method that maximizes the profits of the supply chain and increases the straw supply at the same time.On this basis,the government can implement different subsidy programs for farmers and brokers to increase the economic efficiency of straw power generation supply chain.