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Game Models And Contract Of Green Supply Chain Under Different Dominant Modes With Consideration Of Fairness Preference

Posted on:2020-07-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J M HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330590460540Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Nowadays,in order to solve environmental problems,government takes a series of financial subsidies to stimulate enterprise to start green supply chain management.In recent years,some domestic and foreign scholars have combined the research of green supply chain and government behavior,but most of the research only considered the situation when manufacturer is the leader of the supply chain.In realistic market,the channel power of retailer is becoming stronger to the same as manufacturer,so there are different dominant modes of supply chain now.Since the dominant power usually affects the profit distribution and this condition could easily triggers the fairness preference characteristics of the supply chain members,this dissertation will establish a three-level Stackelberg game model among a manufacturer,a retailer and the government under different dominant modes,considering the fairness preference of supply chain members: The first stage is government making decision of the subsidy factor for green product manufacturers;the second stage is supply chain leaders to make decisions;and the third stage is for supply chain followers to make decisions.Finally,through analysis and comparison,the effects of various parameters on supply chain decision-making results are studied,and the contract that can make the green supply chain coordinate is further studied.First,the three-level green supply chain Stackelberg game model consisting of a non-fairness preference manufacturer,a non-fairness preference retailer and the government was established.By the use of game theory,the optimal pricing,greenness,the profits of supply chain members and society welfare were derived under centralized decision-making model and decentralized decision-making model of manufacturer-dominant,retailer-dominant and vertical Nash modes.Then,the condition when one of the supply chain members who attains less profit could pay more attention to the absolute fairness of profit distribution was considered,and we will introduce fairness preference into decentralized decision-making in the green supply chain.Therefore,we will discuss the influence of fairness preference and different dominant modes on decision-making of supply chain members,their subjective utility and social welfare.Furthermore,the condition when both manufacturer and retailer have fairness preference characteristics under different dominant modes is discussed.Also,we studied the influence of fairness preference of both supply chain members on the performance of green supply chain.Further,we compare the decisions of the conditions when both members are of non-fairness preference,only one of members has fairness preference and both members have fairnesspreference,so that the research field of green supply chain is expanded.In addition,we introduce the revenue sharing contract based on cost-sharing to coordinate the green supply chain considering fairness preference of members under different dominant modes,and the corresponding effective range of the contract parameters to make each green supply chain model to reach the coordinated state is derived.Finally,in the numerical case study,charts are drawn to give readers a more intuitive understanding of the impact of various parameters on the decisions of green supply chain.
Keywords/Search Tags:Green supply chain, Government subsidy, Greenness, Fairness preference, Dominant mode, Contract coordination
PDF Full Text Request
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