Research On The Influencing Factors,Measurement And Application Of Evaluation Quality Of Assets Evaluation Organization In China

The Assets Appraisal Law of the People's Republic of China issued and officially implemented in China in 2016,which opened a new chapter in the supervision of the asset appraisal industry.The promulgation of this law has an important positive significance for improving the asset evaluation system that is closely integrated with the socialist market economy.This also provides a new opportunity for standardized development of asset appraisal organization's quality evaluation and quality supervision system.This dissertation systematically reviews the current status of the asset appraisal organization's quality control and quality evaluation,which finds that current asset appraisal organizations have problems such as incomplete internal control,shortage of standardization and completeness of work papers and appraisal reports.The internal causes of these problems include insufficient staffing of appraisal organizations;appraisers of small appraisal organizations make more frequent adverse selections;and internal control system of appraisal organizations lacks external supervision during implementation.The external causes mainly include the chaotic supervision of asset appraisal organizations;evaluation criteria are not uniform;industry income is monopolized by a few appraisal agencies;The asset appraisal industry faces serious information asymmetry problems and the shortage of talent in the asset appraisal industry.On this basis,this dissertation uses the evolutionary game model to analyze the game issues of the asset appraisal agency and the appraisal client's illegal behavior and law-abiding behavior in evaluation process from the perspective of assessing quality control.As a result,it has been found that if the regulatory agency grants appropriate creditworthiness incentives and appropriate levels of supervision to the appraisal agency,it can ensure the establishment of the law-abiding order in the market.Besides,this dissertation further systematically designs an index system to measure the appraisal quality of Chinese appraisal organizations and set 40 sub-indicators under the four first-level indicators of staffing,internal control,appraisal document,and reputation incentives.At the same time,the AHP method is used to weight the indicator system,and the applicability of the measurement system is studied by using an M evaluation institution as an example.Finally,this dissertation puts forward the relevant feasibility suggestions from the perspective of how to improve the evaluation quality of China's asset appraisal agencies.The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: The first is a systematic review of the history,current status,and evaluation methods of asset appraisal's quality supervision practice.It not only reviews the regulatory agency's criterion documents on asset appraisal behavior,but also summarizes the regulatory measures and practice of China Assets Appraisal Association and the Ministry of Finance.The second is to use the evolutionary game model to construct the behavior evolution process of the asset evaluation client and appraisal agency.The third is based on summing up internal and external reasons that influence the practice quality of asset appraisal organizations and combining the conclusions of the evolutionary game to construct the practice quality of asset appraisal organizations from the aspects of staffing,internal control,appraisal documentation,and reputation incentives.