| Principal-agent conflict from the manager system has existed for more than one hundred years.In order to alleviate the conflict,the company owner had been trying many kinds of incentive measures,but the result is very little.In the late 1950s,the world's first employee stock ownership plan was born,which means that modern sense of stock incentive mechanism has been basically formed and the corporate governance problems leaded by principal-agent conflict began to improve.Stock incentive into China in the late 1990s,however,under the restrictions about the institutional environment,the ability of cognitive and so on,has not received widespread recognition of listed companies.In the meanwhile,the study related to the stock incentive has also been stagnated,and most of the scholars believe that the it cannot make the work in such a special implement environment.In 2005,Chinese reform of non-tradable shares launched,the institutional connected with stock incentive has got much improvement,and listed companies start to proactively explore and practice,which reflect the phenomenon that a bulk of the plan of stock incentive has been put forward.At that time,development of stock incentive in our country stepped into new age.According to statistics,listed companies,which implement the stock incentive plans in China,has the main role,namely new high-tech enterprise.During the past 7 years,the amount of stock incentive plans submitted by those companies spurted sharply,released annual number reached 117.Apparently,it is really in line with the foreign practice.This paper holds that the high-tech enterprise has typical industry characteristics,and the stock incentive implemented by them is representative,which is a reasonable and effective sample in the research on stock incentive.Considering the subprime mortgage crisis impact on listed companies operating performance,this paper would select the new high-tech enterprise as the research sample in our country from 2010 to 2016,which is for further investigating the stock incentive effect by the method of empirical analysis,namely the stock incentive effects on the corporate performance.The empirical analysis of this paper includes two parts:metrological analysis and event study.In the metrological analysis,this paper sets up the dummy variable of stock incentive and the continuous variable of the degree of stock incentive,has verified the correlation between stock incentive and corporate performance ROA&ROE.Conclusion shows that the implementation of stock incentive can improve corporate performance.And increasing the degree of equity incentive also has a positive effect on corporate performance,meanwhile,the effect is not change with the increase of the degree of stock incentive last.In the event study,this paper uses the event-study method to calculate the abnormal returns caused by stock incentive,attempt to verify the correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance from the perspective of market reflection.The result shows that the company's stock incentive behavior made a significant abnormal returns,and the market gave extremely optimistic expectation to the development of the company's future,which further verifies that the stock incentive possess the role of promoting the development of company and improving the management standard of company.Of course,this paper research results only reflect that the new high-tech enterprise has gained the achievements in the practice of the stock incentive.However,in order to promote the continuous development of listed corporate governance efficiency,the stock incentive effect on the performance of the company research still has to follow up dynamically. |