Research On Knowledge Transfer Behavior Incentives From The Perspective Of R&D Outsourcing Open Innovation

As one of the important means of open innovation,R&D outsourcing integrates favorable resources in related fields,thereby reducing innovation costs and improving innovation efficiency.The success of R&D outsourcing depends to a large extent on the transfer of knowledge.Research on knowledge transfer in R&D outsourcing has become a research hotspot in related academic fields at home and abroad.This paper mainly studies the incentives for knowledge transfer in R&D outsourcing.Firstly,according to the type of open innovation,R&D outsourcing is divided into two different cooperation modes: commissioned and cooperative,and the relationship between the contractor and the contractor and the knowledge transfer in the two cooperation modes are analyzed,and then the respective characteristics are respectively constructed to match the knowledge transfer evolution game model,and the model is solved and analyzed.The research shows that in the research of commissioned R&D outsourcing,it is found that the “economic man” hypothesis is somewhat out of the reality.Under the bounded rationality hypothesis,when the contractor does not carry out knowledge transfer and the contractor does not supervise,the mutual game between the two parties A stable state is not achieved;and the supervision of the contractor and the fact that the contractor does not transfer knowledge is not a stable point of mutual game.In order to prevent the emergence of these two extreme behaviors,this paper proposes a differentiated supervision strategy.When solving the analysis of the excitation coefficient,it is found that when the value of the excitation coefficient belongs to different interval ranges,the three states of excitation invalidity,excitation ambiguity and excitation effective state are presented,and only in the range where the excitation coefficient takes a large value.Within,the receiving party can always choose to transfer knowledge.Therefore,from the perspective of the decision-making side of the contractor,in order to promote the knowledge transfer of the contractor and eliminate the “moral hazard” behavior,it is necessary to increase the incentive and punishment.In the research of cooperative R&D outsourcing,it is first found that when the knowledge transfer income ratio of the contractor and the contractor belongs to different combinations of value ranges,there will be five different stabilization strategies in the evolution game of knowledge transfer.Both the knowledge transfer and the knowledge transfer are not possible.The two stable points are likely to occur.The influence of each parameter change on the final stability strategy is analyzed.It is found that the higher the knowledge transfer cost,the probability that both parties will not transfer knowledge.The greater the knowledge input and the comprehensive R&D capability,the greater the probability that both parties will transfer knowledge.Combined with this conclusion,the paper proposes a proposal to control the knowledge transfer cost and enhance the knowledge absorption ability.Secondly,from the stability analysis results of the evolutionary game,both parties are likely to produce “free-riding” behavior,and when joining the third-party incentive mechanism,through the analysis of the results,if the third-party incentives reach a certain level,they can be eliminated.The generation of "free rider" behavior.From this point of view,it is very necessary to develop a sound third-party supervision system.