Research On Tunneling Behavior Of Private Capital Faction Enterprises In A-Share Listed Companies

With the continuous development of China's financial industry,the layout of China's private capital in the financial industry has also continued to expand,and private enterprises have begun to "build a movement" to build a capital chain for industrial integration.From an early point of view,due to the particularity of the company's listing,the company with low quality is delisted after listing,and the government encourages the shell to go public in order to solve these dilemmas.Some enterprises that urgently need funds to develop and expand have made the distressed companies get rid of the bad financial situation through the injection of high-quality funds of listed companies and the improvement of management,and then bring more benefits to the private capital faction enterprises and listed companies to achieve a win-win situation.However,in the follow-up development stage,some private capital faction enterprises obtained the actual control of listed companies by buying shells to deprive short-listed companies of their behavior,in order to maximize their own interests.Through multi-level inter-layer holding,the controlling shareholder obtains a large amount of funds,and the listed companies in the false packaging company are transferred to the private capital faction enterprises to achieve the purpose of tunneling.This is especially true for private capital faction enterprises.The controlling shareholder is mainly in the form of private capital faction enterprises and the separation of the two powers is high.The corporate governance is complicated,which leads to the hidden path of private capital faction enterprises.The development route from Deron,Greencool and Tomorrow can be seen as the initial development,rapid expansion,short-term financing,rapid expansion,and the lack of crisis capital chain and the final decline.It can be seen that due to the special environment of China's capital market,private capital faction enterprises can alleviate the financing dilemma and promote the diversified development of enterprises.However,the excessively rapid expansion and excessive diversification have led to private capital faction enterprises tunneling behavior which caused by related party transactions,controlling shareholders' holdings,etc.The regulation and governance of the family model is an urgent problem to be solved.First of all,this paper combs the current situation of the model of private listed companies in China.From the basic characteristics of the private capital faction enterprises,the analysis of the capital operation of the private capital and the comparison between the private capital faction enterprises and the non-private faction enterprises,it is found that the private capital faction enterprises are mostly distributed in the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta.Two industries and mainly focus on manufacturing.In addition,the private capital faction enterprises will increase the capital arbitrage path through the capital operation(M&A and fixed financing)to achieve rapid expansion.At the same time,the separation of the two powers of private capital faction enterprises is generally high,and there is a risk that the controlling shareholder will tunnel the listed company in order to realize the personal interests of the company.Secondly,this paper takes the 2006-2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples,and measures the tunnel behavior of major shareholders by the proportion of other account receivables,the proportion of related transactions,and the proportion of equity pledge,in order to study on the tunnel behavior of private capital faction enterprises.The empirical research results show that compared with the non-private capital faction enterprises,the private capital faction enterprises account for a higher proportion of other receivables,a higher proportion of related transactions and a larger proportion of equity pledge,and the tunnel behavior is obvious.However,after joining the internal and external conditions of corporate governance,private capital faction enterprises have little influence on the proportion of equity pledge.Further,this paper analyzes the heterogeneity from the perspective of the separation of the two powers,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the duality of the two jobs,and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors.The study found that under the conditions of other conditions remain,the higher the separation of the two powers of private family enterprises,the greater the proportion of the largest shareholder,and the more obvious the tunnel behavior.Private capital faction enterprises with the two roles of chairman and general manager have little influence on the tunnel behavior;the institutional investors of private enterprises have the effect of external supervision,which has a certain inhibitory effect on the tunnel behavior of the company's major shareholders.In the robustness analysis part,this paper uses the Heckman two-stage model and the robustness test based on PSM paired samples,and the research conclusions remain robust.Finally,this paper proposes relevant recommendations from the perspective of corporate governance and listed companies.Through the combing of the development status of private capital faction enterprises,this paper empirically explores the ways of tunnel behaviors,enriching the research on the relationship between private capital faction enterprises and tunnel behaviors.In addition,this paper verifies the degree of influence on the tunnel behavior from the perspective of the internal environment and external supervision of the private enterprise in the corporate governance.It complements the follow-up supervision and how to suppress the study of tunnel behavior.