Pricing Strategy For Crowd-sourcing Logistic Service

the concept of "shared economy" has brought new opportunities and challenges to this traditional labor-intensive industry.Social idle self-scheduling service providers have been effectively shared among crowdsourcing logistics platforms.Workers no longer work only for one platform,and the platform does not employ logistics service personnel for a long time.self-scheduling service providers freely arrange working hours.The level of remuneration directly affects the decision-making of crowdsourcing service personnel participating decision in work,thus indirectly affects the service supply capacity of the platform.In addition,self-scheduling service providers will speculate the success rate of online order-grabbing after joining the platform through the scale of consumer demand at the other end of the platform.This strategic behavior of service provider brings difficulties to the operation and management of crowdsourcing logistics service platform.Although most of the literature on “Shared Economy” or “on-Demand Platform” assumes that consumers and self-scheduling service providers are impatient,according to the application background of this paper,considering the different characteristics of logistics services from other types of services,that is,consumers and self-scheduling service providers may have relatively high degree of patience.Without loss of generality,this paper discusses the matching of supply and demand of crowdsourcing logistics service platform when consumers or self-scheduling service providers are patient or impatient.This paper first solves the problem that there is only one oligopoly platform in the market,and then extends the model to the price competition problem of the two oligopoly platforms.If consumers and service providers are impatient,the optimal service pricing of the platform is static.When there is only one oligarch platform in the market,this paper finds that when the wage rate is low,the optimal static pricing of the platform makes some consumers rationed;when the reward rate is high,the optimal static pricing of the platform makes some self-scheduling service providers rationed.In the duopoly model,it is interesting that when the price competition between platforms is moderate,the optimal service pricing of platforms are independent of the intensity of market competition.If consumers and self-scheduling service providers are patient,the optimal service pricing of the platform is dynamic.This paper discusses the two situations : demand peak period and demand low period,solves the optimal pricing trajectory of the oligopoly platform and the duopoly platform,and analyses the pricing incentive of the platform.Finally,this paper extends the model to the market with two kinds of people: patience and impatience.In addition to solving the optimal pricing of platforms in various situations,this paper also gives a analysis of the platform's OM trade-offs and optimization mechanism,besides,this paperinvestigated platforms' incentives of pricing adjusting.which provides business operators with rich management insights.