The Research On Collecting Strategies In Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based On Differential Game

How to collect used products in the closed-loop supply chain has always been the focus of the researchers. This paper proposes the dynamic product collecting model by considering the dynamic characteristic in the product collect process. The optimal control strategies of different models are solved by the differential game approach. The paper starts from the basic dynamic collecting model, and extends the model from three different aspects.Firstly, by considering the dynamic characteristic in the product collecting process, the basic model of this paper, i.e., dynamic collecting model is proposed. The differential game is used to seek the optimal control strategies in the scenario of manufacturer collecting and retailer collecting in the closed-loop supply chain. The product collecting rate beyond the manufacturer collecting channel is higher than that in the retailer collecting channel. And the retailer always prefers the manufacturer collecting channel. The manufacturer collecting is the optimal channel for manufacturer when comprehensively considering the economic factors with noneconomic factors, such as enterprise social responsibility.Secondly, the basic dynamic collecting model is extended into the scenario of retailer competing in the supply chain. The differential game is used to seek the optimal control strategies in the scenario of manufacturer collecting and retailer collecting in the closed-loop supply chain. The Saddle point equilibrium exists only under certain condition, and which can be reached by the optimal control strategy. When there is competing retailers in the supply chain and the retailer collects the product, the product collecting between the competing retailers has’first move advantage’effect to the retailers. When the competing intensity is increasing, it is beneficial to the product collecting for the closed-loop supply chain and also beneficial to the profit increasing of manufacturer and retailer.Thirdly, the basic dynamic collecting model is extended into different channel power structure scenarios. The Nash game, manufacturer leader Stackelberg game as well as retailer leader Stackelberg game are analysis by the differential game approach. When the dominating the channel, the retailer can obtain most of the benefits which come from remanufacturing activity, thus the retailer has enthusiasm to collect more used products.Finally, the basic dynamic collecting model is extended into stochastic collecting model by considering the stochastic disturbance in the product collect process. The feedback control strategies are found in the scenarios of centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain by the stochastic differential game approach. The stochastic evolution path of product collect rate is analyzed. When the intensity of stochastic disturbance increases, the manufacturer would improve the investment in the product collect activities. And a two-part pricing contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.