Research On The Low Level Equilibrium Of Rural Pension

As the aging process intensifies,the issue of old-age care has become one of the major concerns of the moment.The low level of rural equilibrium refers to the development of the working economy and the increase of the city's efforts to support the rural areas.The rural economic level has generally improved,but the rural pension level has not increased significantly.A larger proportion of rural household economic accumulation is used to pay the cost of marriage and the cost of class competition.In terms of family wealth distribution,it is mainly inclined to the offspring,which leads to the low level feedback state of the old-age state.This paper first discusses the performance of rural low-level balanced pension from the village overview and material support,life care and spiritual comfort.Secondly,this paper further analyzes the reasons for the emergence of low-level balanced pension in rural areas.Thirdly,based on the analysis of the status quo and the reasons,this paper further proposes the impact of low-level balanced pension in rural areas.Finally,this paper summarizes and appropriately forecasts the new order and new trends of old-age care.Through in-depth research on the village A in Guanzhong area,the author is now in a low-level equilibrium state in rural areas in Guanzhong.The author analyzes the reasons from the perspective of family mechanism,state policy support and the decline of village public norms.The family mechanism includes production and resource redistribution.Production mainly refers to the family's livelihood model;the redistribution of rural household resources in Guanzhong mainly involves marriage cost,class mobility and urbanization.The livelihood model of rural households in Guanzhong is mainly “half-work and half-cultivation”,that is,young offspring go out to work,and the elderly are working at home and looking after the grandchildren;the resources available in this livelihood model are relatively few.In the redistribution of family resources,the family-oriented family ethics makes the fathers tend to allocate resources to the children.As the cost of marriage in the children increases,the class competition becomes more and more fierce,making the resources of the children's needs come.The more resources there are,the less resources are allocated to the fathers,the material resources of the elderly are tense,and the level of old-age care is declining.From the perspective of national policies,it is precisely because of the abundance of national resources that Guanzhong's already deficient material pension is maintained at a low level of equilibrium.Finally,due to the public decline of the village,the decline in the old-age norms in the villages has further reduced the material support of Guanzhong pensions from the family.This low-level balanced pension also affects the intergenerational relationship and the concept of “filial piety”,which ultimately leads to the phenomenon of poverty in the elderly.Judging from the intergenerational relationship,with the improvement of the status of the offspring in the family,the power of the daughter-in-law in the family rises,making the authority of the old man continue to decline,and the status of the elderly is marginalized.The concept of "filial piety" has also changed."Children's anti-aging" has been affected.The son's responsibility for old-age care has begun to shrink.His daughter has participated in the pension,and the main body of the old-age is diversified.Finally,the paper concludes with a discussion of the new changes in the rural care for the elderly in Guanzhong,and proposes a new trend of rural pension in Guanzhong.