Governance Of Non-State-Owned Shareholders And Social Burden Of State-Owned Enterprises

As the leading force of the national economy,the important support of the public sector of the economy,the nature of ownership and the characteristics of public capital make the government require state-owned enterprises not only to undertake the profitable mission of guaranteeing the value-added and value-added of state-owned assets,pursuing economic benefits,but also practicing the provision of social services.Public mission.At the same time,state-owned enterprises have long existed the phenomenon of "lack of ownership" and "one big share",providing the conditions and environment for the government to intervene in state-owned enterprises.Therefore,under the special political and economic system of our country,state-owned enterprises are not only an important one.Economic entities,while also having social and political colors,combined with historical issues such as the legacy of past institutional reforms,state-owned enterprises still bear a heavy social burden.Despite the company system and shareholding system reform,China's state-owned enterprises have established a relatively complete corporate system,but the local government after the decentralization reform still bears political responsibility in employment,welfare,social stability,etc.,and still has intervention in state-owned enterprises.The strong motivation is concentrated in the internalization of political functions into the business activities of state-owned enterprises,which in turn makes state-owned enterprises exhibit the governance characteristics of internal control under government intervention.In 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee formulated and reviewed and adopted the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms",stating that"a mix of state-owned capital,collective capital,and non-public capital,such as cross-shareholding and mutual integration.The ownership economy is an important form of realization of the basic economic system,which laid the foundation for a new round of mixed ownership reform and opened the prelude to deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new era.Through the introduction of non-state-owned capital,the problem of state-owned enterprise agency caused by excessive government intervention and manager self-interest can be alleviated to a certain extent,and the governance level of state-owned enterprises can be improved.However,there are few relevant literatures in academia,but there is little research on the possible impact of non-state-owned shareholders' governance on the social burden of state-owned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.Based on the above background,this paper takes the 2013-2017 China Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company as a research sample,and manually collects the shares and staff assignments of the top ten shareholders of state-owned listed companies by using the multiple regression and group return.The method explores the effect of non-state-owned shareholders' governance on the social burden of state-owned enterprises from the two dimensions of equity structure and high-level governance.The study finds that:(1)Whether in the equity structure dimension or in the high-level governance dimension,non-state-owned shareholder governance can significantly reduce the social burden of state-owned enterprises,compared with the non-state-owned shareholders' simple shareholding ratio,and state-owned Shareholders' formation of equity checks and balances and delegates to the state-owned enterprise governance layer can more effectively suppress the social burden of state-owned enterprises;(2)Based on the administrative level of state-owned enterprises,it is found that the non-state-owned shareholders have a negative impact on social burdens compared with central enterprises.The influence is more obvious in local state-owned enterprises;(3)Based on the comparison of the functions of state-owned enterprises,it is found that the suppression of social burden by non-state-owned shareholders is more reflected in the state-owned enterprises in commercial competition than the public-profit enterprises.It is obvious;at the same time,it is found that the participation of non-state-owned shareholders in the high-level governance dimension has significantly increased the social burden of special-function state-owned enterprises.The innovation of this paper is:in theory,first of all enrich the research perspective of social burden.In the past,academic circles mainly focused on policy burdens,and most scholars studied the motivations and economic consequences of policy burdens.However,with the continuous advancement of state-owned enterprises' deepening reforms,under the background of the supply-side structural reform of "de-capacity",the functions of state-owned enterprises to undertake strategic burdens have been weakened,which is highlighted by the commitment of regional governments to expand employment and increase In terms of welfare expenditures and public functions in maintaining social stability,a few scholars have switched their research perspectives to social burdens in recent years,but there are few related literatures.Secondly,based on the background of the new round of mixed ownership reform,this paper demonstrates the role of non-state-owned shareholders in promoting the "release and redundancy' of state-owned enterprises,not only enriching the relevant literature on the governance of non-state shareholders,but also making up for In the past,the study on the reform of mixed ownership system focused on the scope of economic scope and the shortcomings of the scope of light society.In terms of policy,mixed ownership reform as a top-level design mechanism,as a new round of policy to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises,mainly through the introduction of "in place" non-public forces,giving full play to the non-state-owned shareholders in the governance of state-owned enterprises The positive role of public capital and non-public capital form a synergistic effect.Therefore,we must not only see its role in ensuring the "enhancement" of state-owned enterprises,but also see its influence in promoting the "downgrade" of state-owned enterprises,and help the state-owned enterprises to reduce the social burden of redundancy.It is the intrinsic goal and proper meaning of the hybrid top-level design.Based on this perspective,the research on the social burden of state-owned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform in the context of mixed ownership reform will help to provide some empirical evidence and policy reference for the future reform of state-owned enterprises.