The rules of the game: A comparative case study of carbon-based energy policy in Canada and the European Union

This thesis hypothesizes that in most multi-level systems the authority to control natural resources is the responsibility of the lower level of government. This is a significant issue because the authority to manage natural resources is of economic, political and environmental importance. To examine this hypothesis two principal questions are addressed. How is policy formulated and implemented in multi-level systems? Which level of government possesses decision-making authority on which issues?;To investigate this hypothesis a comparative case study is applied. The selected cases examine and compare intergovernmental relations in Canada and the European Union. The cases focus specifically on aspects of policy-making in the carbon-based energy sector of both systems between Alberta and the Canadian federal government and the United Kingdom and the European Union. The evidence appears to demonstrate that in both systems the rules of the game do favour the lower level of government in this policy sector.