| Based on a case study of a privately-owned automobile enterprise (Geely Holding Group) in China, this study aims at exploring the interactions between institutional environment, local government and individual enterprises, as well as answering these two questions: Under an ambiguous institutional environment, (1) how can the private automobile enterprise deal with various institutional barriers and be able to survive and develop? (2) what role does local government play in this process? Informed by the work of Victor Nee, here in this thesis I put forward an integrated theoretical framework of institutions, local government, enterprises and social network in order to analyze the issues raised above. Qualitative research methods, such as participant observation, in-depth interview and archival research, were employed to collect data in the field.;It is found that institutional ambiguity is not only an obstacle but also an opportunity for organizational growth. Institutional ambiguity may create grey zones in the economic fields, where enterprises have chances to break through the administrative barriers with the help of local government. Economic and technical barriers can be partially lowered by administrative barriers. On the other hand, institutional ambiguity does increase the indeterminacy of economic actions; so the enterprises incline to rely on social network and establish legitimacy to reduce the risk.;As the economic reform deepened, private sector became the major force in the industrial expansion and collective sector diminished dramatically. Previous researches on the role of local government have been challenged. Instead of "local government as industrial firms" put forward by Andrew Walder, this dissertation proposes a new explanation "local government as agents". Local government has withdrawn from the direct intervention in firms' internal management. It turns to offer public services, as well as help firms to achieve institutional innovation and obtain scarce institutional resources. The firms will pay back to the local government in the forms of tax and other non-financial income. There are mutual selections between "agents" and "star" firms. Horizontal competitions between different governments always exist, and the "star" firms make use of these competitions to bargain with government to obtain more favorable policies.;Institutional ambiguity increases the cost of implementing rules and regulations on the local level, which makes local government more powerful in explaining and executing policies. Thus, local government has many chances to "filter" or "purify" institutional factors which are inconsistent with local interests, and share the profit with enterprises in its jurisdiction by helping them break through the institutional barriers. Based on the interaction between institution, local government and enterprises, cooperative alliance between enterprises and local government has been established, while the relationship between the central and local governments is covered non-cooperative. |
