Binding the Germans and talking with the Soviets: United States disarmament policy and the Junktim with German reunification, 1955--1960

The major purpose of this thesis is to provide a clearer understanding of the foreign policy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Administration. The character of Eisenhower's foreign policy has been a focal point of debates among historians. This thesis examines changes in Eisenhower's foreign policy by focusing on the Junktim, or the policy which demanded Soviet concessions to promote the reunification of Germany on Western terms as a precondition for an agreement on arms reduction and/or arms control between the two blocs.; This thesis shows that the Eisenhower Administration made several important changes in the Junktim in order to achieve a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and President Eisenhower tried to open disarmament negotiations over the issues on which they believed they could proceed without any progress toward German reunification. One of the concrete results of their efforts was the opening of the Geneva negotiation over a nuclear test suspension in October 1958.; Abandoning the policy of the Junktim was not an easy task for the Administration because this policy was an expression of the U.S. support for the reunification policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was one of the most important allies for the United States after World War II. Fearing that a U.S. withdrawal from the Junktim might heighten nationalist sentiment in West Germany and damage West Germany's tie with the West, Washington could not totally neglect Bonn's insistence on the Junktim. As a result, Washington's interest in disarmament negotiations with Moscow was not consistently reflected in its policy.; In spite of its sensitivity to Bonn's perspective, Washington changed the American and the Western policy of the Junktim in order to promote negotiations with Moscow. This change suggests the Eisenhower Administration was interested in improving U.S.-Soviet relations at the cost of growing difficulties in the alliance relationship. It also indicates changes in the Cold War in the second half of the 1950s.