| In this thesis I consider whether Nietzsche's perspectivism can be properly understood as a coherent theory of truth, by reference to the interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism by Maudemarie Clark in Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. I argue that the presentation of perspectivism offered by Clark overlooks Nietzsche's view that the value of truth is a question of primary importance over that of the meaning of ‘true’. I argue that Nietzsche's perspectivism is not the ultimate presentation of his views on truth, but the outcome of his critique of truth, which should be understood to include three aspects: a psychological critique of the will to truth, an epistemological critique of the ability to apprehend truth in itself, and an ontological critique of the existence of truth in itself. I conclude that by overlooking the psychological aspect, Clark is unable to make Nietzsche's critique of truth compatible with his assertions about perspective. |
