| Why do groups of organizations have so much trouble cooperating? Existing macro-organizational theory is ill equipped to answer this for two reasons. First, there is a tendency in existing theory to confuse the interest of the group with the interests of the individual organizations that are its constituent parts. From this perspective, the presence of a common problem alone can explain the emergence of cooperation in a group. In the real world, however, the existence of common problems is only imperfectly correlated with the extent of cooperation actually observed. Second, the ability of organizations to use network ties to manage their interdependence is greatly overestimated. To help correct these deficiencies, this thesis draws upon three literatures: collective action, public goods and neoinstitutional economies. The resulting theory leads to refutable propositions about the way organizations might manage the interdependence that results from facing a common problem. The propositions are then tested through a comparative case study of R&D consortia in the microelectronics industry. |
