| Is it in the social interest to allow or encourage firms in the same industry to cooperate? If so, how can competing firms be induced to cooperate in their mutual interest? The theory of quasi-public goods suggests that there are situations in which it may be in the social interest to allow or encourage competition in addition to cooperation, though there are attendant dangers as well. The theory of collective action suggests that leadership and organization are often needed to allow individuals to overcome barriers to cooperation. Governments and industry associations can provide and disseminate information, mediate negotiations and assist in the creation of cooperative plans and institutions, and monitor and enforce adherence to the collective agreements reached in them.; This thesis explores these issues through examination of matched case studies of industrial policymaking in Japan and Taiwan since the first oil shock. The cases are coping with surplus capacity in the steel minimill industries of both countries; standardization of product formats in the Japanese consumer video industry; and standardization and joint research in the personal computer industry of Taiwan.; Both countries possess a basic capacity to induce cooperation when there is unanimity among private firms about the need for it (for example, in the face of foreign competition), but neither allows collective action to be used as a competitive tool against less influential firms or new competitors. Thus, collective action may have a positive impact in some cases, but the scope under which it can be used, or misused, is distinctly limited.; The two governments differ, however, in the way they approach cooperation. The Japanese government tends to support the private sector and to act as a mediator of conflicts among firms. It lacks many powerful sanctions, and the overall political structure offers certain opportunities for firms disadvantaged by collective action to seek redress. The Taiwan government is more autonomous and possesses numerous potential sanctions, but the restrained view of cooperation held by top leaders and its own internal limitations tend to keep it, for better or worse, from enforcing collective action in the face of opposition. |
