Research On The Evolution Of Incentive Policies For Prefabricated Buildings From The Perspective Of Cost Effectiveness

Prefabricated buildings have the advantages of energy saving,environmental protection,safety,and efficiency,which fully demonstrate the concept of sustainable development.At present,governments at all levels in China have formulated future development goals and a series of incentive policies for prefabricated buildings.The development of prefabricated buildings has entered a new era,but in the process of development,it still faces higher cost challenges.Developers The benefits cannot be fully guaranteed,resulting in less enthusiasm for the development of prefabricated buildings.In order to accelerate the development of prefabricated buildings,the government’s incentive policy is particularly important.This study aims to explore the optimization and improvement of incentive policies and provide relevant theoretical basis for the government to formulate more efficient and accurate incentive policies.First of all,the basic characteristics of prefabricated buildings are sorted out,the concept of prefabricated building costs and benefits and its constitution mechanis m are explained in detail,the contradiction between incremental cost and incremental benefit of prefabricated buildings and its impact on the development of prefabricated buildings are analyzed.Secondly,looking at the development history of prefabricated buildings,use the relevant data in recent years to analyze the development of prefabricated buildings and the status quo of policy incentives.Summarizing the specific problems existing in prefabricated buildings and imperfections in government incentive strategies,it is proposed that government incentive strategies are the key to motivating the development of prefabricated buildings.Then,based on the evolutionary game theory and system dynamics method,the game relationship between the government and the building developer is analyzed,and the parameter variables involved in the process are determined.Calculate the payment function obtained by the government and the building developer under different strategies,derive the replication dynamic equations of the two,analyze the stability strategies of both sides,and complete the establishment of the evolutionary game model.On this basis,according to the logical relationship between the government and developers in the evolutionary game model,a system dynamics model is established,and the relevant causality diagrams and system flow diagrams are drawn to complete the model construction.Finally,the empirical research is carried out with specific assembly projects,combined with the evolutionary game and system dynamics model constructed in this paper,and computer simulation is performed by Vensim software.Simulate various situations inside the system,and analyze the impact of various factors on the system.Based on the simulation results,a series of combined suggestions are proposed on how to improve the prefabricated building incentive policy system.In general,this article expounds the cost and benefit structure of prefabricated buildings from the perspective of cost and benefit,and analyzes the contradictions existing in prefabricated buildings.On this basis,it summarizes the probl ems of the development of prefabricated buildings and the existing incentive policies,constructs an evolutionary game and system dynamics model between the governm ent and building developers,and analyzes the transmission of prefabricated building incenti ve policies from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.mechanism.Through simulation and analysis of actual cases,suggestions for improving and optimizing related incentive policies are finally obtained.It provides a theoretical reference for related research on the development of prefabricated buildings,and contributes to the gradual realization of industrialization in the construction industry.