| The development of new energy vehicles is an important strategic measure to promote global green development.After years of development,new energy vehicles industry in our country has made certain achievements,but the core technology innovation ability is still insufficient,government subsidies become an important factor affecting the further development of the industry.Driving range is one of the important factors affecting the sustainable development of the new energy vehicle industry,in the promotion of the application and high-quality development of new energy vehicles through government subsidies,there are two research perspectives based on the driving range: one is the perspective of consumers,that is,consumers’ perception of insufficient driving range will produce range anxiety,which restricts the popularization and application of new energy vehicles.In this regard,the government tries to counteract the effects of range anxiety by subsidizing the buying process;Second,from the perspective of enterprises,that is,under the constraints of cost and price,due to the low technology level of new energy vehicle battery,the driving range is relatively insufficient,which restricts the popularization and application of new energy vehicles.In this regard,the government promotes technological innovation and increases the driving range of new energy vehicles through subsidies for the R&D of enterprises.Based on the above background,this thesis establishes a game model including the government,enterprises and consumers.From the perspective of driving range,the thesis studies the mechanism and effect of the new energy vehicle subsidy policy from the perspectives of consumer subsidy and enterprise R&D subsidy respectively,which provides a micro theoretical basis for the adjustment and optimization of the new energy vehicle subsidy policy at this stage.The main research contents and conclusions are as follows:First,the thesis studies the impact of consumer subsidies based on range anxiety.The factors such as range anxiety,consumer heterogeneity,subsidies and their environmental benefits are included in the dynamic game model to discuss the impact of unit consumer subsidies on the market demand of new energy vehicles and the decision-making problem of subsidy retrogression.Assuming that new energy vehicles are durable goods,consumption has two-stage characteristics;range anxiety only exists in stage 1 and disappears in stage 2;the government implements unit subsidies in both stages,but in stage 2,it adopts the policy of subsidizing retrogression(i.e.subsidies are reduced);there is a substitution relationship between new energy second-hand cars and new cars.The results show that:(1)Consumer unit subsidies based on range anxiety can increase the total market demand for new energy vehicles,but the structure has different effects on the demand in the two stages,the specific impact is related to the subsidy retrogression.(2)The increase of consumer range anxiety will increase the marginal positive effect of unit subsidy on total demand and stage 1 demand.When the subsidy retrogression is small,the increase of range anxiety will reduce the marginal positive effect of unit subsidy on stage 2 demand;when there is more subsidization retrogression,the increase of range anxiety will increase the marginal negative impact of unit subsidy on stage 2 demand.(3)The relationship between government subsidy retrogression decision-making and consumer range anxiety is affected by the environmental benefits of subsidies.When the environmental benefit of unit new energy vehicles is high(beyond a certain threshold),the higher the range anxiety of consumers,the more the government subsidies retrogression.This is because the higher the range anxiety is,the greater the marginal impact of the decline of stage 2 subsidy on the increase of stage 1demand is,so that higher subsidy environmental benefits can be obtained with lower subsidy cost.Second,the paper studies the impact of corporate R&D subsidies based on driving range.Divide enterprise R&D subsidies into output subsidies and range subsidies,incorporate factors such as new energy vehicle driving range and government R&D subsidies into the model analysis.Analyzed and compared the policy effects of R&D subsidies for enterprises of different models,and discussed the impact of the retrogression of government subsidies on enterprise technological innovation.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)with the increase of Government R&D subsidy(whether range subsidy or output subsidy),the driving range of new energy vehicles increases,market demand increases,enterprise profits increase,but social welfare levels increase first and then decrease small.(2)On the comparison of subsidy model,compared with range subsidy,the output subsidy can achieve a higher level of social welfare,lower new energy vehicle prices,higher driving range,more market demand of new energy vehicles and more profits of enterprises;but in the range subsidy mode,the promotion effect of subsidy on the improvement of driving range is more efficient.(3)The effect of subsidy retrogression on technological innovation of new energy vehicle enterprises is affected by consumers’ sensitivity to driving range.When the sensitivity of consumers is very high,the retrogression of subsidies can reverse the incentive of technological innovation;But when the sensitivity of consumers is low,this effect does not exist.The main contribution of this thesis is to study the impact of subsidy policy and its adjustment from two aspects of consumer subsidy and enterprise R&D subsidy,aiming at the driving range problem existing in the current development of new energy vehicle industry.Among them,range anxiety and two types of R&D subsidy are discussed separately.The above contents broaden the research perspective of new energy vehicle subsidy policy,and provide theoretical basis for the optimization and adjustment of new energy vehicle industry policy. |